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Abstract
In recent decades, the US has experienced a widening of the college enrolment
gap between rich and poor families. This is commonly interpreted as evidence for a
tightening of borrowing constraints. This paper asks whether this is indeed the case.
I present an incomplete-markets overlapping-generations model with college enrol-
ment, in which altruistic parents provide transfers to their children. In the model the
rise in earnings inequality observed between 1980 and 2000 acts as the driving force for
generating the trends in the data. With the help of counterfactual experiments, I find
that fraction of constrained households is much higher (24 instead of 8 percent) than
indicated by the narrow enrolment gap in 1980. Contrary to what the development of
the enrolment gap in the data suggests, the share of constrained households actually
fell (to 18 percent) between 1980 and 2000. I show that altruism is important for
explaining these findings.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, the US has experienced a widening of the college enrolment
gap between rich and poor families. This was documented by Ellwood and Kane (2000) and
Belley and Lochner (2007). In this paper, I study the driving forces behind this development.
I am particularly interested in understanding whether an increase in enrolment gaps implies
that borrowing constraints have become binding for a larger fraction of population.
Answering this question is relevant for wide range of policy issues, like the design of
college subsidies, or questions concerning social mobility. Following the seminal work of
Becker and Tomes (1979), many papers have analyzed whether constraints are binding, with
mixed evidence.1 A popular approach of gauging the importance of borrowing constraints
is to compute the college enrolment gaps between children of rich parents and children of
poor parents (e.g. Ellwood and Kane (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Kane (2006)).
The implicit assumption made here is that children from rich families are not financially
constrained in their college choice because they receive enough support from their parents
while children from poorer parents do not have access to such funds. Indeed, parental
transfers constitute an important source of college financing in the data (see e.g. Gale and
Scholz (1994) and Keane and Wolpin (2001)). Accordingly, a stronger impact of family
income on college attendance, which has been observed for the US, suggests that borrowing
constraints play a more prominent role (Belley and Lochner (2007), Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo (2010)).
In this paper, I develop a quantitative theory of college enrolment which is designed to
shed light on the complex interaction between family resources, parental transfers, children’s
academic ability and borrowing constraints underlying the enrolment pattern in the data.
The model features incomplete markets and idiosyncratic productivity shocks, as in the
seminal contribution of Aiyagari (1994). Households go through a life cycle of working and
retirement, as in Huggett (1996).2
The key innovation of my paper with respect to the previous empirical literature is the
structural approach of modeling parental transfers. This approach allows me to trace out
the behavioral responses of parental transfers with respect to changes in the economic en-
vironment, e.g. changes in the return or in the cost of education, which the US economy
has experienced recently (see e.g. Krueger and Perri (2006), Heathcote et al. (2010) and
Collegeboard (2005)). My model can also be used to assess whether the enrolment gaps
observed in the data are informative about binding borrowing constraints. This is an impor-
tant contribution to an ongoing debate in the literature (Ellwood and Kane (2000), Carneiro
and Heckman (2002), Kane (2006), and more recently Brown et al. (2011)).
I show that the fraction of households that are borrowing constrained in their college
decision is much higher than the average enrolment gap. The average enrolment gap in
the model is just below 7 percent and thus in line with the data from the beginning of the
1Kane (2006) and Brown et al. (2011) contain recent overviews. Kane (2006, p.1396) concludes that ”[. . . ]
it is difficult to find a definite test of the existence of borrowing constraints in the literature”.
2Huggett and Ventura (2000), Storesletten et al. (2004a), among others, have shown that models of this
class are consistent with many empirical facts of savings and consumption over the life cycle.
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1980s (Carneiro and Heckman (2002)). The fraction of borrowing constrained households
is 24 percent and thus more than three times as high. Perhaps surprisingly, my model
predicts that the fraction of constrained households declined over time, from 24 percent at
the beginning of the 1980s to 18 percent at the beginning of the 2000s. This fall occurred in
the model despite the fact that it is - broadly - consistent with the increase in the enrolment
gap observed between 1980 and 2000 (Belley and Lochner (2007)).
In order to understand this apparent contradiction, it is important to consider the dif-
ferent college financing opportunities in the model first. I assume that college education is
financed with the help of parental transfers and loans.3 When modeling parental transfers,
I assume that parental transfers occur because parents are altruistic towards their offspring,
following the seminal work of Barro (1974) and Becker (1974). Parental altruism can be
imperfect, as in Laitner (2001).
With respect to loans, Keane and Wolpin (2001) find that borrowing opportunities for
college financing are limited in the US. I model this constraint by assuming that the amount
households can borrow against their own future earnings is restricted. This is a standard
life cycle liquidity constraint, see e.g. Cunha and Heckman (2007). An additional constraint
prevents parents from borrowing against their children’s future income to finance investments
in them. This is the intergenerational borrowing constraint, see Brown et al. (2011). Because
altruism is only one-sided and intergenerational borrowing is prohibited, parents face a trade-
off between saving for their own future consumption and providing transfers to their children.
Parents may find it optimal to underinvest in their children’s college education, in which case
the intergenerational borrowing constraint is binding. Whether lifetime liquidity constraints
prevent young households from attending college thus depends on the willingness of young
households to invest in college as well as on their parents’ willingness to provide support.
In my model, the decision of children to invest in college is a function of the cost and the
(expected) return, which in turn depend on academic ability. Academic ability is defined
as the set of all skills relevant for college education. It is partly transmitted from parents
to children. Academic ability influences the probability of dropping out from college before
graduating. More able students are more likely to complete their education (Chatterjee and
Ionescu (2010)). Only college graduates receive an educational premium on their earnings.
More able students also need to pay less for tuition, as documented by McPherson and
Schapiro (2006). Consistent with the US system of college financing, I also assume that the
direct cost of tuition a student faces are negatively correlated with family resources: students
from rich families pay more tuition than students from poor families.
The extent to which the willingness of children to attend college exceeds their parents’
willingness to provide support also hinges on specific parameter values. I thus choose the
key model parameters, such as the discount factor, the tightness of the borrowing constraint,
the degree of intergenerational discounting, the transmission of ability across generations,
and the cost of college education by calibrating the model separately to moments from US
3According to Keane and Wolpin (2001), students finance between 20 and 60 percent of their college
expenses by parental transfers. In total, parental support for their children’s college education is substantial.
Gale and Scholz (1994) document that parental payments amounted to 35 billion dollar in 1986.
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economy at the beginning of the 1980s (the benchmark calibration) and the 2000s.
The results that follow from the benchmark calibration imply that the fraction of house-
holds restricted in their college decision by the presence of lifetime liquidity constraints is
much higher than indicated by the average enrolment gap. This suggests that the enrolment
gap is not a good measure for the actual fraction of constrained households. There are two
reasons that lead to this conclusion. The first is that the enrolment gap does not capture
the fact that the intergenerational borrowing constraint may be binding even if parents are
rich. Because altruism is one-sided and imperfect, even parents that are well-off may face
a trade-off between providing transfers and own savings. Also not captured by the average
enrolment gap is the fact that the cost of attending college are lower for children of poor
families, all other things equal. This is because this group receives subsidies. In a world
without borrowing constraints, children from poor families are thus more likely to enrol in
college compared to children from rich families, all other things equal. I show that these two
mechanisms are able to explain the stark difference between the results from the previous
literature which are based on the average enrolment gap and the actual share of constrained
households in my model.
In order to mimic the situation at the beginning of the 2000s, I raise earnings inequality
and tuition fees. The rise of the college premium makes attending college more attractive.
This is partly outweighed by the increase in tuition fees which makes attending college more
expensive. Children from rich families can afford to pay the increased tuition. As a result,
enrolment rates for children with rich parents rise. Since enrolment rates from children from
poor families do not change substantially between 1980 and 2000, we observe an increase in
the enrolment gap between children from rich and poor families. However, this does not mean
that borrowing constraints became binding for a larger fraction of the population. Borrowing
constraints became less binding for both children from rich and poor families. By definition,
the group of the income-rich parents benefited the most from the increase in inequality, as
their income increased with respect to the average. Therefore, these parents are now affluent
enough to invest optimally in their children’s education. Because of the prominent role the
rise in earnings inequality plays for my results, my paper makes an important contribution to
the recent literature that studies the macroeconomic consequences of rising wage inequality
in the US (see Krueger and Perri (2006), Heathcote et al. (2010)).
Instead, children from poor families finance college mainly by borrowing. In my model,
college dropouts cannot discharge their debt, consistent with the rules that are applied in the
US (Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010)). That is, college loans need to be repaid, independently
of whether college is completed successfully or not. Since the college wage premium is only
earned by those who actually graduate, the repayment rules for college loans decrease the
willingness of risk-averse households to borrow to finance their college education. In the
context of my model, this implies that the fraction of borrowing constrained households
from poor families decreased over time, since these households are not willing to accept the
additional risk that would be associated with borrowing more in order to finance the increase
in tuition fees.
The question whether education gaps are due to inefficiencies is of first-order importance
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for public policy. My findings imply that borrowing constraints have a strong influence on
college attendance but that the connection between observable enrolment gaps and binding
borrowing constraints turns out to be rather loose. This suggests that enrolment gaps should
be interpreted with caution if one is interested in detecting inefficient education outcomes.
Empirical support for the existence and the bindingness of the intergenerational borrow-
ing constraint has been provided in an important recent piece of work by Brown et al. (2011).
Both my model as well as theirs share the assumption that parental altruism is one-sided.
Based on this assumption, they identify families which invest inefficiently in their children’s
college education. They find that the fraction of constrained families accounts for up to 50
percent of the relevant population. My paper complements the work of Brown et al. (2011)
by using a quantitative model. This approach allows me to consider a rich life cycle model
where earnings are uncertain, ability is transmitted between generations and the cost and
return of education differ between students in various dimension. Considering a quantitative
model also allows me to compute a wide set of moments and compare them to the data,
such as the development of the enrolment gaps over the last decades.4 Importantly, both
my findings as well as the results from Brown et al. (2011) point to the fact that borrowing
constraints affect a substantially larger proportion of the population in their college decision
compared to what the preceding literature has suggested.
An increasing number of papers implement altruism in computable life cycle models
with endogenous education choice. Most recently, Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (Gallipoli
et al. (2010), henceforth GMV (2010)) propose an OLG model with one-sided altruism and
sequential education choice.5 GMV (2010) introduce an aggregate production function where
different types of human capital are not (necessarily) perfectly substitutable. They allow
explicitly for changes in life cycle earnings and wealth profiles. When estimating the earnings
process, they also distinguish between permanent ability and idiosyncratic labor shocks. For
their estimation, GMV (2010) use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Survey of Young (NLSY). With
the help of their model, the authors compute the effect of different policy interventions on
optimal education decisions, inequality, and output.6 Compared to GMV (2010), my paper
sheds light on the interaction between one-sided altruism and borrowing constraints as a
determinant of college enrolment. Moreover, I show that parental transfers are important
for explaining the changes in the relationship between family income and college enrolment
that have occurred over time.
This paper is also related to a number of important papers in the literature that incorpo-
rate altruism to study education policies, such as Caucutt and Lochner (2004), Restuccia and
Urrutia (2004), Cunha (2007), Bohacek and Kapicka (2010) as well as Holter (2011). Some
4Moreover, my approach allows me to consider various forms of financial college aid, such as need-based
and merit-based aid, as well as the interaction between altruism and life cycle saving motives.
5Early papers analyzing the general equilibrium implications of education policies include Heckman et al.
(1998) and A´bra´ha´m (2004), who examines wage inequality and education policy in a general equilibrium
OLG model with skill biased technological change.
6Garriga and Keightley (2007) are also interested in optimal education policies. They do not endogenize
parental transfers. Instead, they explicitly model the dropout decision and labor supply during college.
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of these contributions focus on skill formation (as in Cunha (2007)) or on the relative impor-
tance of early versus late credit constraints, as in Caucutt and Lochner (2004). Bohacek and
Kapicka (2010) study the welfare effects of educational reforms. Both Restuccia and Urrutia
(2004) and Holter (2011) are interested in the determinants of earnings persistence. Cunha
(2007) as well as Bohacek and Kapicka (2010) assume two-sided altruism: families care both
about their predecessors and their descendants. Under this assumption, parents and chil-
dren pool their resources and solve the same maximization problem. Two-sided altruism
thus implies that children provide transfers to their parents as well. However, there is little
evidence for this in the data, as argued by Gale and Scholz (1994) and Brown et al. (2011).
Caucutt and Lochner (2004), Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and Holter (2011) also assume
one-sided altruism. Compared to these papers, I focus on explaining the development of
enrolment gaps over time and on analyzing the impact of borrowing constraints.
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010) argue that borrowing constraints became binding
for a larger fraction of the population between 1980 and 2000. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo
(2010) derive borrowing constraints endogenously from the design of government student
loan programs and from limited repayment incentives in private lending markets. They use
their setup to analyze the impact of an increase in the tuition fees and the college premium.
They find that the minimum level of pre-college wealth that is required to guarantee efficient
investment in college education rises significantly, despite the fact that an increase in the
college premium raises the amount of credit that is provided by private lending markets. In
this paper, I endogenize the initial wealth distribution by assuming parental altruism. This
enables me to compare my model to the patterns of family income and college attendance
that are observable in the data. Importantly, my results show that when the initial wealth
distribution is generated by one-sided altruism, increasing earnings inequality and raising
tuition actually reduces the fraction of constrained households over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in Section
2. Section 3 gives the household’s problem in recursive notation, while Section 4 introduces
the equilibrium definition. The calibration of the model’s parameters is presented in Section
5. I discuss my results in in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Overview. I consider a life cycle economy with altruistic parents. Parents provide transfers
to their children. Children take parental transfers as given, and decide about whether to
attend college or not. Children can also borrow against their future earnings. All other
credit markets are closed, in particular, parents are not allowed to borrow against the future
income of their descendants. I allow for idiosyncratic productivity shocks during working
life. These assumptions allow me to study the effects of an endogenously generated initial
distribution of assets on college enrolment, and to analyze the determinants of the initial
asset distribution in a realistic life cycle setting.
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Figure 1: Life cycle and Generation Structure
The Life Cycle of a Household. There is a continuum of agents with total measure
one. I assume that the size of the population is constant over time. Let j denote the age of an
agent, j ∈ J = {1, 2, ..., Jmax}. Agents enter the economy when they turn 21 (model period
j = 1). Before this age, they belong to their parent household and depend on its economic
decisions. During the first 45 years of their ’economic’ life, agents work. This implies that
the agents work up to age 65 (model period Jwork = 45). Retirement takes place at the age
of 66 (j = 46), which is mandatory. When agents turn 51 (j = 31), their children of age 21
form their own household. This implies a generational age gap of 30 years. It is assumed
that there is one child household for each parent household. Agents face a declining survival
probability after their children leave home. Terminal age is 81 (Jmax = 60). Since annuity
markets are closed by assumption, agents may leave some wealth upon the event of death.
The remaining wealth of a deceased parent household is passed on to its child household.
The assumptions regarding the life cycle and the transfer behavior are summarized in
Figure 1.
Labor Income Process. During each of the 45 periods of their working life, agents
supply one unit of labor inelastically.7 The productivity of this labor unit of an j-year old
agent is measured by εejη
j,e, where
{
εej
}Jw
j=1
is a deterministic age profile of average labor
7College graduates work for fewer periods, see below.
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productivity of an agent with education level e:8
e ∈ E = {hs, col}
where hs denotes high school education and col college education. For retired households
and for students attending college, εej = 0.
ηj,e describes the stochastic labor productivity status of a j-year old agent with education
level e. Given the level of education e, I assume that the labor productivity process is identical
and independent across agents (no aggregate productivity shocks) and that it follows a finite-
state Markov process with stationary transition probabilities over time. More specifically,
Q(ηe, N e) = Pr(ηj+1,e ∈ N e|ηj,e = ηe)
for high-school graduates. N e = {ηe1, ηe2, ..., ηen} is the set of possible realizations of the
productivity shock ηe.
College Investment, College Attendance and College Completion. Upon enter-
ing the economy, all households possess a high school degree.
I assume that the time it takes to complete a college degree is four years. In the US, as
well as in other OECD countries, there is a significant fraction of students who enter college,
but actually leave without having obtained a degree, see e.g. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004)
or Akyol and Athreya (2005).
Upon entering college, students are required to own enough resources to finance their
studies. Financial conditions thus do not matter for college completion, which is consistent
with evidence provided by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007). In my model, students
drop out because they fail to achieve the requirements that are necessary to obtain a degree.
I assume that more able students are also more likely to graduate. Light and Strayer (2000)
as well as Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010) report that there is a strong positive correlation
between college completion and performance in scholastic tests. I denote the college dropout
probability by λ.
In line with evidence provided by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007), I assume that
the time until dropout is two years. Akyol and Athreya (2005) cite evidence for the fact that
the return to the later years of college is substantially higher compared to the return to the
first two years. Based on this finding, I assume that college dropouts face the same earnings
process as high school graduates. As a consequence, college investment is indivisible.
In the following, I discuss the formation of academic ability, which is the underlying force
of behind college success, in greater detail.
Ability and its Formation. I define academic ability as the set of skills (both cognitive
and non-cognitive) that is relevant for success in college. Academic ability is thus denoted
by the college success probability (1−λ). I assume that academic ability has no direct effect
8I do not consider high school dropouts. The share of high school dropouts is small in the data, see
Rodriguez et al. (2002) who measure a share of 17 percent in the 1998 SCF.
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on earnings, other than through education.9 Cawley et al. (2001) argue that it is hard to find
an impact of cognitive and non-cognitive skills on earnings, after controlling for schooling
attainment.10
The formation of skills is an active research area. So far, it appears to be consensus that
the family ”plays a powerful role in shaping abilities through genetics, parental investments
and through choice of child environments”, as Cunha and Heckman (2007, p.1) put it. In
order to capture the role of genes, I assume that at the beginning of their life cycle, households
are endowed with innate ability f. Innate ability is partly transmitted from their parents,
following a transition matrix Γ.
Following Keane and Wolpin (2001), I assume that other determinants such as parental
investments in early education and parental choices of child environments can be approxi-
mated by the educational achievements of parents, in the following denoted by ep. In the
data, educational achievement is highly correlated across generations.11 Moreover, Carneiro
et al. (2007) find that an additional year of mother’s schooling increases the child’s perfor-
mance on a standardized math test by almost 0.1 of a standard deviation.12.
Parental education ep and innate ability f interact in determining the academic ability
and thus also the probability of college success (1 − λ), respectively. Evidence presented
by Cunha and Heckman (2007) suggest that genes - innate ability in my context - and
environmental factors (approximated by parental education) interact in multiple ways during
childhood and adolescence in the formation of skills. Given these non-linearities, I do not
impose any parametric structure on the process of skill formation. Instead, I will calibrate
the values of λ that are associated with different combinations of f and ep endogenously.
As mentioned above, there is strong positive correlation between the performance in stan-
dardized test scores, such as the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) or the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT), and college completion rates.13 Since a single test score is unlikely to
capture the full set of skills that are necessary for college success (Carneiro and Heckman
(2002)), I distinguish between ’academic’ ability and ’observable’ ability in the following.14
Let K denote a random variable with realization κa. κa denotes the performance of a
young household in standardized test scores. Both κa and λ are known to children (and their
9Also see Heathcote et al. (2010)
10Cawley et al. (2001) show that the fraction of wage variance explained by measures of cognitive ability
after controlling for human capital measures such as education and work experience is low. They argue the
correlation between measured cognitive ability and schooling is so high that it is not possible to separate
the two unless one is willing to make strong assumptions the parametric structure (e.g. log-linearity and
separability), which Cawley et al. (2001) test and reject. The authors also provide evidence for the fact that
non-cognitive skills (such as having self-discipline to follow the rules) also impact earnings mainly through
schooling attainment.
11See Black and Devereux (2010) for a comprehensive and recent review of the empirical literature
12With respect to the channels that transmit the effect of maternal education to the child, they find
a substantial role played by income effects, delayed childbearing and assortative mating. Other potential
channels that are mentioned in the literature are neighborhood effects, family stability and preferences for
education (Haveman and Wolfe (1995))
13SAT scores and AFQT scores are highly correlated, see footnote 7 in Light and Strayer (2002).
14Moreover, as noted by Heckman et al. (2006) , standardized tests are affected by a person’s schooling
and family background at the time tests are taken, which makes test scores a noisy measure for true ability.
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parents) at the time the college decision is made, while only κa is observable by the public
(e.g. colleges). I will also refer to κa as ’observable’ ability. More specifically, I assume
that K ∼ N (µf,ep , σf,ep), where the mean and the standard deviation depend on f and ep,
to account for the empirical fact that test scores and college completion probabilities are
correlated. Let f(µf,ep , σf,ep) be the corresponding probability density function. In the next
section, I discuss the relationship between observable ability and the cost of college.
In sum, my model of education and skill formation is consistent with the following empir-
ical patterns: (i) a positive correlation between college attendance/completion and measures
of ability, (ii) a positive correlation between college attendance/completion and parental
education, (iii) a positive correlation between measures of ability and earnings.
Direct Cost of College Education. I assume that the cost of college are perfectly
negatively correlated with observable ability. That is, the cost of college are given by κ =
−κa. Two remarks are in order. First, since κa can be positive or negative, κ can be
positive or negative as well. Negative cost of education should be interpreted as a stipend
which covers part of the living expenses.15 Second, because of the tight relationship between
observable ability and the cost of education, I will use the terms observable ability and cost
of college as synonyms in the remainder of the paper.
A negative link between observable ability and tuition arises through the admission policy
of US college and universities. These institutions compete for the best students (i.e. those
with the highest test scores) with the help of financial aid packages (Linsenmeier et al.
(2002)). As a result, better students need to pay less in order to enrol in college.16
Individual aid packages can be explicitly based on academic promise and achievement
(so called ”merit aid”). Only a small fraction of students are recipients of merit aid. Most
students receive so called ”need based aid”, which is officially based on their ”expected
family contribution to pay” (further details follow below). Here, it is important to notice
that most financial aid packages are implicitly based on student’s merit, even if they are
labeled differently.17
The following figures make this point clear. A 100 point difference in the SAT increases
(need-based) grant aid between 500 and 2300 Dollars (in prices of 1996) over the course
of a college career (McPherson and Schapiro (2006)). Private institutions typically have
15As I will outline in the calibration procedure (see Section 5) the share of students with negative cost of
college turns out to be below 1 percent, which is in line with the fraction of students that receive generous
grants.
16More talented students are more likely to generate positive peer effects, thus enhancing the education of
all students. Attracting students with higher levels of measured quality is also important for an institution’s
reputation, see McPherson and Schapiro (2006).
17McPherson and Schapiro (2006) write: ”Normal practice at American colleges is to present a prospective
student with a ”package” of aid, generally including some combination of federal, state and institutional
grant, a recommended loan, and a work-study job. [. . .] By the same token, two students at the same
college, both receiving only need-based aid, may receive quite different aid packages. The more desirable
student may receive either a larger total aid package or a similar total aid package with a larger component
of grant aid and lower amounts of loan and work. And this can happen without any of the dollars being
labeled ”merit” dollars. (McPherson and Schapiro (2006, pp. 1412-1413).
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more resources at their disposal and thus offer more generous aid packages (Long (2004) and
Collegeboard (2010)). These findings imply that a student from the lower end of the ability
distribution has to pay between 3000 and 14000 Dollar more for his college education than
a student at the upper end.18
The fact that the direct cost of college education are lower for young households with
higher levels of observable ability generates heterogeneity with respect to the total cost of
college education. All other things equal, more able students will be more likely to attend
college, a pattern that is also observable in the data. Other dimensions of heterogeneity of
the cost and return of attending college are generated by assuming that financial aid is higher
for students from poorer families, which is discussed in the next section. The (expected)
return of attending college differs because more able students are more likely to complete
their education.19
Subsidies and Need-Based Financial Aid. Need-based financial assistance is based
on the ability of the student’s family to pay, the so-called ’exptected family contribution’. It
is calculated on the bases on parental income and wealth (Feldstein (1995)). A student with
poor parents can expect to receive more financial assistance than a student whose parents are
well off. I denote the fraction of direct college expenses (κ) that is covered by financial aid
by ν. The net direct costs of college attendance, after financial help is taken into account,
are given by (1 − ν)κ(I(κ) > 0), where I(κ) is an indicator function taking the value 1
if college expenses are positive.20 ν is a function of parental income and parental assets,
ν(yp, ap). Because parental assets enter the calculation of the expected family contribution,
there is an ”education tax rate” on capital income, which has a powerful adverse effect on
capital accumulation, according to Feldstein (1995). Two remarks regarding the expected
family contribution are in order. First of all, as pointed out by Brown et al. (2011), the
18These figures are based on the assumption that students at the lower end of the distribution have a SAT
scores below 700, while students at the upper end have scores above 1300. According to Chatterjee and
Ionescu (2010), 8 percent of the students who took the SAT score below 700, while about 15 percent score
higher than 1300.
19There are other ways to generate heterogeneity. In important contributions, GMV (2010) and Heathcote
et al. (2010) assume that tuition is the same for everybody. Instead, they assume that college education
is associated with utility costs (’psychic’ costs), which are higher for the less able. Heckman et al. (2005)
argue that the direct costs of college education are the sum of tuition and psychic costs. To what extend
the direct costs are determined by tuition or by psychic costs remains an open question. The reason is
that it is not possible to measure psychic costs directly in the data (Heckman et al. (2005), footnote 32).
According to Heckman et al. (2005), psychic costs are needed to explain the observation that the take up
rate is low, despite the fact that (ex-post) monetary return from attending college is high. Recently, Ozdagli
and Trachter (2009) show that this so-called ”returns to education puzzle” can be explained if one allows for
risk-averse decision makers, who face the uncertainty about the outcome of college. Ozdagli and Trachter
(2009) conclude that this provides ”[. . .] a less controversial explanation for the once obscure psychic costs”
(p. 25). Moreover, estimates provided by Dynarski (2003) suggest a quantitatively significant role of tuition
costs in explaining college enrolment. She finds that increasing tuition subsidies by 1000 Dollar (in prices of
1998) raises college enrolment by 4 percentage points. In the appendix, I show that my modeling strategy
is consistent with the empirical elasticities found by Dynarski (2003).
20Recall that negative direct costs from college may occur if the measured ability of the student is very
high and the student receives a scholarship.
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expected family contribution that is calculated from the family’s ability to pay is not legally
guaranteed. Put differently, there is no way children can actually force parents to give what
they are expected to pay. Second of all, as noted by Dick and Edlin (1997), the financial
aid that the student actually receives does not necessarily cover the difference between the
expected family contribution and cost of college. Federal programs do not provide enough
subsidized aid to meet the need of all students, and most colleges are not committed to cover
the entire residual (Dick and Edlin (1997)).
Assets and Loans. Household accumulate savings in form of assets aj. They borrow
by taking out loans χ. Consequently, aj ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0. Borrowing can only take place at
the beginning of the life cycle, either to finance college education or for non-college related
expenses or both.
Loans are assumed to be closed-end installment loans, which are characterized by fixed
payments and a fixed term. This assumption is motivated by the fact that college loans
are commonly closed-end loans, see e.g. GMV (2010). Moreover, installment loans are the
most sizable component of unsecured consumer debt.21 Consequently, I abstract from ’open-
ended’ credit (such as credit card debt). The assumption that all borrowing takes place at
the beginning reflects the findings that this is the stage of the life cycle where credit is most
needed.22
I assume that the terms and conditions for χ follow the ones for US college loans. In the
following, I outline some institutional details regarding the market for college loans. The bulk
of loans are provided under government sponsored loan programs (GSL), such as Perkins or
Stafford.23 All loan programs have in common that participants need to repay their loans in
full, independently of whether they completed college successfully (Chatterjee and Ionescu
(2010)). This implies that financing college by loans is associated with a substantial financial
risk.
Participating students can defer loan payments until six (Stafford) or nine (Perkins)
months after leaving school (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010)).24 Under the standard
21Using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), Kennickell and Shack-Marquez (1992) report that
42 percent of all households whose head is younger than 35 years have taken out installment loans (other
then car loans) in 1983. At the beginning of the 1980s, installment loans were thus the most important form
of unsecured consumer debt. Installment loans appeared not only to be more frequent, but also to be more
sizable. The median amount of installment debt carried by households was 1600 Dollars, whereas it was just
600 Dollars in form of credit card debt (in 1989 Dollars). More recent waves of the SCF confirm this pattern.
22Kaplan and Violante (2010) compute that more than 40 percent of households borrow at the beginning
of the life cycle. The desire to borrow vanishes as households grow older, and approaches zero around the age
of 50. This corresponds roughly to the pattern that we observe in the SCF, see Kennickell et al. (2009). In
my benchmark calibration, which I outline below, the fraction of households that have zero financial wealth
following age 22 is only 4 percent.
23At least until the mid-1990s, only a few private lenders offered student loans outside the government
sponsored loan programs (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010)). Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010) report
that amount of student loans coming from private sources has risen since then, although private loans appear
to be most prevalent among graduate students in professional schools and undergraduates at high-cost private
universities.
24Unsubsidized loans accrue interest over the deferment period. Accrued interest payments are added to
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repayment plan, borrowers have up to ten years to repay their loan in full. However, there
are several circumstances under which borrowers can postpone their repayments, for example
in times of economic hardship. At the maximum, borrowers can extend the repayment period
up to 25 years.25 As an approximation, I thus assume that all borrowers repay their loans
in 25 years, starting from the year in which college students graduate.26
I denote the per-period installment by lj. College students are exempted from debt
service while enrolled in college, which implies that lj = 0 if 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 and for all j ≥ 31.
Accrued interest is accumulated and added to the principal. After having finished college,
the total amount due is thus given by χ(1 + r∗)4, where r∗ is the subsidized interest rate
on college loans, r∗ < r. Loans are subsidized by the government. For 5 ≤ j ≤ 30, lj is
calculated as follows. First, I assume that the repayment scheme is fixed, as it is common
for installment loans. In addition, I also assume that the (per-period) loan redemption ι is
constant and given by χ(1+r
∗)4
25
. This implies that residual debt declines at a linear rate over
the repayment period. Because of falling interest payments, lj falls from ι + r
∗χ(1 + r)4 to
0 between j = 5 and j = 31.
I assume that the interest rate, net of capital taxes or subsidies, is the same for assets and
loans. This requires that r∗ = (1−τk)r. Together with the repayment structure, this implies
that I can assume that all households take out loans up to the upper limit χ¯. The amount of
the loan resources that households do not spend on college or non-college related expenses
can be saved in financial assets. By doing so, households can exactly replicate the payment
stream resulting from the loan. This simplifies the households decision problem considerably,
since I do not need to keep track of the debt holdings of each individual household. I further
assume that the loan system is managed by a financial intermediary, and that the subsidy
on the interest rate are covered by the government.
With respect to the existence of borrowing limits, Keane and Wolpin (2001) document
that borrowing limits exist and are tight. They report that the maximum annual amount
of loans that can be taken out of the GSL Program is about 25 percent of the average
undergraduate tuition, room and board expenses across two and four year colleges in the
academic year 1997-98. They conclude that it is impossible to finance even one year of
college using uncollateralized loans.27
the loan principal. For subsidized loans, the government covers the interest on loans while students are
enrolled (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010)).
25http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/OtherFormsOfRepay.jsp (retrieved on
September 10, 2011)
26Since death does not occur before the age of 53 (j=33), no agent dies in negative net worth.
27Keane and Wolpin (2001) identify borrowing constraints by measuring net worth. The proportion of the
sample with negative net worth increases from 11.5 percent at age 20 to 16.3 percent at age 25 and then falls
to 9.1 percent at age 30. Keane and Wolpin (2001) further report that average net debt, conditioning on
having negative net worth is generally on the order of 5000 US- Dollar. At age 25, i.e. shortly after college,
16 percent of the group with negative net worth held debt of more than 10,000 US- Dollar and 20 percent
less than 1000 US- Dollar, which are small amounts, given that the average undergraduate tuition, room and
board expenses across two and four year colleges in the academic year 1997-98 amounted to almost 10,000
US-Dollar, according to Keane and Wolpin (2001)
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Altruism and the Timing of Parental Transfers. Besides loans, parental transfers
are the other source of financing at the beginning of the life cycle. In the model, there are
intended and unintended transfers flowing from parents to their children. Intended transfers
are generated by one-sided altruism, as in Laitner (2001), Nishiyama (2002), GMV (2010)
and Brown et al. (2011).28 One-sided altruism implies that parents care about the lifetime
well-being of their mature children, but not the other way round. I assume that a parent
household decides about intended transfers at the age of 51, when the child household is
21 and forms an independent household. Gale and Scholz (1994) find that the mean age of
transfer-givers is 55 years in the 1983-1986 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Given the initial endowment received from the parent, the child can then decide whether
to consume the resources received from the parent, save it for future consumption and/or
spend it for college investment. It is important to note that because parents are altruistic,
they anticipate the division of their transfers that is optimal from the children’s point of view.
The resulting allocation is the same as if parents decided themselves about the optimal split
between education investment and pure financial transfers.29
Unintended transfers take the form of end-of-life bequests and arise because lifetime is
uncertain and annuity markets are absent. Upon the event of death, the remaining parental
wealth is passed on to the children.
A remark regarding the timing of the transfers is in order. As noted by Laitner (2001),
if children are not borrowing constrained, the timing of transfers is indeterminate. In this
case, parents are indifferent between giving transfers at the beginning of the child’s life cycle
in form of inter-vivos transfers, at the end of their own life in form of bequests, or by making
a sequence of gifts in-between. This holds as parents can commit to a specific sequence of
transfers, implying that parents and children do not strategically interact. If children however
face (potentially) binding borrowing constraints, it is optimal for an altruistic parent to make
transfers as early as possible, i.e. at the beginning of the life cycle. The result that binding
liquidity constraints trigger transfers holds even if there is no commitment and parents and
children play a dynamic game (Barczyk and Kredler (2010)). There is indeed ample empirical
evidence for the fact that households that are subject to binding borrowing constraints are
more likely to receive transfers (see e.g. Cox (1990)). In line with this evidence, I thus assume
that all intended transfers resulting from parental altruism are made at the beginning of the
child’s life cycle, where borrowing constraints are most likely to be binding.
Technology. A representative firm produces a final output good Y using aggregate phys-
ical capital K and aggregate labor measured in efficiency units L as inputs. The production
technology F (K,L) obeys constant returns to scale.
Government. The government collects taxes from labor and asset income at rates
(τw,τk). Tax revenues are used to finance pension benefits pen, college subsidies ν as well as
28I allow for the fact that altruism may be imperfect.
29In the following, I will use the terms ’financial transfers’, ’inter vivos transfers’ and ’financial inter vivos
transfers’ interchangeably.
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subsidies on the interest rate r. The government adjusts τw in order to balance its budget
in every period.
3 Recursive Problem
It is convenient to describe the recursive problem by going backward from retirement age. I
thus first consider the optimization problem of a parent household, afterwards the problem
of a child household.
3.1 Parent households
A parent household is of age j such that 31 ≤ j ≤ Jmax. A parent household works
during the first 15 years and is retired afterwards. The household faces a declining survival
probability, ψj < 1 if j ≥ 33.
Parent Households, After Retirement. When retired (j ∈ {46, ...Jmax}), the house-
hold receives social security benefits, pen, and chooses consumption cj and its end-of-period
wealth level aj+1. The optimization problem of this household can be written in recursive
formulation as follows:
Vp,r(s
j
p,r) = max
cj ,aj+1
{
u(cj) + βψjVp,r(s
j+1
p,r )
}
(1)
where β is the discount factor. Vp,r(sp,r) is the value function of a retired household facing
a state vector sp,r, given by
sjp,r = (aj, j)
The household maximizes (1) subject to
aj+1 = (1 + r(1− τk))aj + pen− cj,
aj+1 ≥ 0 and cj ≥ 0
r is the interest rate on capital and taxes on capital income are denoted by τk In the terminal
period Jmax = 60, the continuation value is zero. Households consume their remaining wealth
and aJmax+1 = 0.
Parent Households, Working, After Transfers Have Been Made. A parent
household who is working and who has provided transfers to its child household is j years
old, where 32 ≤ j ≤ 45. This household earns w per (efficient) unit of labor, which is
supplied inelastically. Total labor productivity depends on the education level e as well as
on the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity shock ηj,e. The parents’ problem then
reads as follows:
Vp,w(s
j
p,w) = max
cj ,aj+1
u(cj) + βψj ∑
ηj+1,e∈Ne
Vp,w(s
j+1
p,w )Q(η
j,e, ηj+1,e)
 (2)
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where Q(ηj,e, ηj+1,e) is the law of motion for productivity shock and sjp,w is the vector of state
variables at age j, given by
sjp,w = (aj, e, η
j,e, j)
Agents maximize (2) subject to the budget constraint
aj+1 = (1 + r(1− τk))aj + (1− τw)wεejηj,e − cj,
where τw denotes a linear tax on labor income. Again, financial assets are required to be
positive:
aj+1 ≥ 0 and cj ≥ 0
In the last period before retirement (j = 45), the continuation value is replaced by βψjVp,r(s
j+1
p,r ).
Parent Household, First Period: I now describe the parental problem in the first
period of parenthood j = 31. At this stage, parents choose their own savings aj+1 and
the transfers to their child household in such a way that their total utility is maximized.
Transfers are denoted by tra.
Expressed in terms of a Bellman equation, the decision problem of a parent household
at j = 31 reads as
Vp,w(s
31
p,w) = max
c31,a32,tra
{
u(c31) + βψ31
∑
η32∈Ne Vp,w(s
32
p,w)Q(η
31, η32)
+ςV0(s0)
}
(3)
where ς is the intergenerational discount factor. I allow for imperfect altruism, that is,
0 ≤ ς ≤ 1. If ς = 0, parents care only about their own utility. The model thus nests a pure
life cycle economy (ς = 0) and a dynastic model (ς = 1) as extreme cases. Both Laitner
(2001) and Nishiyama (2002) show that the observable flow of transfers is consistent with
an intermediate case.
V0(s0) denotes the discounted lifetime utility of a young household at the beginning of
his economic life. It depends on s0 = (tra, κ, f, e
p). V0(s0) is described in greater detail in
the next section.
Parent households face the following state variables at j = 31:
s31p,w = (a31, e, η
31,e, f, κ)
Notice that the innate ability level of the child f as well as the level of κ are part of the
parent household’s state space because together with the parental education level e, these
variables determine the cost of college as well as the likelihood of dropping out of college.
The parental budget constraint is given by
a32 = (1 + r(1− τk))a31 + (1− τw)εe31η31,ew − tra− c31
aj+1 ≥ 0 and cp,1 ≥ 0
In the following, I describe the problem of a young (child) household.
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3.2 Young households
Young household are of age 1 ≤ j ≤ 30. The problem of a young household depends on
the status of his parents. Children with parents who are alive expect to receive bequests in
the future, and thus need to keep track of their parents’ wealth holdings. In the following,
I thus distinguish between young households with deceased parents and young households
with parents who are alive. Since parent household do not die before age j = 33, the problem
of a young household with deceased parents starts at the age of j = 3.30
Young households with deceased parents: I first describe the recursive problem of
a young households whose parents are dead. The optimization problem of this household
reads as
Vy,d(s
j
y,d) = maxcj ,aj+1
u(cj) + β ∑
ηj+1∈Ne
Vy,d(s
j+1
y,d )Q(η
j, ηj+1)
 (4)
where Vy,d(.) is the value function of a young household with deceased parents and sy,d is
the vector of state variables in period j, which is given by
sjy,d = (aj, f, e, η
j,e, j)
Agents maximize (4) subject to the constraints
aj+1 = (1 + r(1− τk))aj + (1− τw)wεejηj,e − cj − lj
aj+1 ≥ 0 and cj ≥ 0
.
College students (e=col) do not receive income while studying, that is, εe=colj = 0 for
1 ≤ j ≤ 4. Moreover, by assumption, debt does not need to be serviced in the first four
years (lj = 0), independently of the education level.
At j = 30, in the last period before young households become parents, the continuation
value is replaced by
β
∑
fc
∑
ηj+1∈Ne
∫
κ
Vp,w(s
31
p,w)f(κ;µf,ep , σf,ep)dκQ(η
j, ηj+1)Γ(f, fc)
where the transmission of household specific types between (becoming) parents and their
children needs to be taken into account.
Young households whose parents are alive. I now consider the problem of a young
household whose parent household is alive. I denote the asset holdings of the parents of a
household at age j by apj .
30This is for simplicity as parental education is an important determinant of children’s dropout probability.
Recall that students who leave college without a degree do this at the end of model period j = 2.
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The child household does not know when the parent household dies. As a consequence,
the value function is a weighted sum of the utility it receives if the parent household dies
and the utility which is obtained if the parent continues to live for another period. Since
the age gap between parent and child household is 30 years, the survival probability of the
parent household is given by ψj+30. The optimization problem can thus be described by the
following functional equation:
Vy,a(s
j
y,a) = max
cj ,aj+1
{
u(cj) + β(1− ψj+30)
∑
ηj+1∈Ne Vy,d(s
j+1
y,a )Q(η, η
j+1)
+βψj+30
∑
ηj+1∈Ne Vy,a(s
j+1
y,a )Q(η, η
j+1)
}
(5)
The state vector sjy,a is given by
sjy,a = (aj, a
p
j , f, e, e
p, ηj,e, ηj
p,ep , j)
Rational expectations imply that children are perfectly able to forecast their parents’
asset holdings. Therefore, children know the law of motion of parents’ asset holdings, and
apj , e
p, ηj
p,ep become part of the children’s information set. When parents are retired, this
reduces to apj .
College students deserve special attention, as they face a certain probability of leaving
college without graduating. In line with empirical evidence discussed before, I assume that
dropping out occurs after two years of college. Hence, at j = 2, the recursive problem of
college students reads as follows:
Vy,a(s
j=2
y,a |e=col) = max
cj ,aj+1
{
u(cj) + β(1− λf,ep)
∑
ηj+1∈Ne Vy,a(s
j=3
y,a |e=col)Q(η, ηj+1)
+βλf,ep
∑
ηj+1∈Ne Vy,a(s
j=3
y,a |e=hs)Q(η, ηj+1)
}
(6)
where λf,ep is the probability of dropping out from college without a degree. λ depends
the innate ability f and the level of parental education ep.
At the age of j = 30, the child household knows that its parent household will die for sure
in the current period. The continuation value is as stated above for the young households
with deceased parents.
The budget constraint depends on whether parents died in the previous period or not. If
not, the constraints are given by
aj+1 = (1 + r(1− τk))aj + (1− τw)wεejηj,e − cj − lj,
aj+1 ≥ 0 and cj ≥ 0
Again, college students (e=col) do not receive income while studying and εe=colj = 0 for
1 ≤ j ≤ 4. Moreover, lj = 0) if 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, independently of the education level.
If the parent household dies in period j−1, child households inherit the residual (end-of-
period) wealth holdings from their parents, and the per-period flow budget constraint reads
as
aj+1 = (1 + r(1− τk))(aj + apj) + (1− τw)wεejηj,e − cj − lj
aj+1 ≥ 0 and cj ≥ 0
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3.2.1 Young Households, College Investment Decision
At the beginning of their economic life, young households receive transfers tra from their
parents, decide about attending college and how much to borrow. I assume that this takes
place before the realization earnings shock and before consumption and saving decision are
made in the first period.
The college investment decision is based on the cost of college κ as well as the innate
ability f and parental education ep. Because the productivity shocks ηj,e depend on the
education level, the decision about attending college needs to be taken before the first period’s
productivity shock η1,e materializes.
V0(s0) = max
e∈{hs,col},a1
{
E
[
Vy,a(s
j=1
y,a |e=col,a1)
]
, E
[
Vy,a(s
j=1
y,a |e=hs,a1)
]}
(7)
where the subscript 0 indicates that the college enrolment decision takes place before
young households haven taken other economic actions. The expectation is taken with respect
to the set of possible productivity shocks in the first period.31
The constraints of this problem are as follows:
a1 = tra+ χ¯− κ|e=colν(ap,1, εejη31,ew)
a1 ≥ 0
The state vector that households faces when making this decision is given by
s0 = (tra, κ, f, e
p)
Young households take parental transfers tra as given. All young households borrow up
to the maximum debt limit, which is χ¯.32 Based on the cost of college (net of subsidies) κν,
households decide about attending college. The optimal education choice for an individual
that faces the state vector s0 is described by edu(s0). The residual financial resources a1 are
kept for future consumption.
4 Definition of a Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
Define S as the state space corresponding to the vector of state variables in the household
problems (1-7) with generic element s. Let ΣS be the sigma algebra on S and denote the
corresponding measurable space by (S,ΣS). The measure of households on (S,ΣS) is denoted
by Φ.
I define a stationary recursive equilibrium in the economy I study as follows
31I assume that productivity shocks in the first period are equally likely.
32As outlined above, the assumption that all households borrow up the limit is inconsequential, since the
interest rates on borrowing and lending are the same.
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Definition 1 Given a government policy {pen, τk} and a college subsidy rule ν, a Station-
ary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is a set of value functions V (s) and a set of policy
functions {edu(s), c(s), a(s), tra(s)}, non-negative prices of physical capital and of effective
labor {r, w}, and a measure of household Φ such that hold:
1. Given prices and policies, the value functions V (s) are the solutions to problems (1)-
(7). The functions {edu(s), c(s), a(s), tra(s)} are the associated policy functions.
2. The prices r and w are consistent with profit maximization of the firm, i.e.
r + δ = FK(K,L)
w = FL(K,L)
3. The labor tax rate τw adjusts such that the government’s budget is balanced:
τw =
pen
∫
Sp,r
dΦ + Ξ + Λ− τkrK
wL
where the total amount of college subsidies Ξ is given by
Ξ =
∫
Sy,0
(1− ν(ap,1, εejη31,ew))κedu(sy,0)dΦ
and the total amount of subsidies on the interest rate for loans Λ is given by
Λ = (r − r∗)
∫
Sy,0
χ¯dΦ
4. The financial intermediary runs a balanced budget:∫
Sy,0
χ¯dΦ =
∫
Sj≤30
ιdΦ
5. The asset market, the labor market and the final good market clear:
K =
∫
S
a(s)dΦ
L =
∫
Sj≤JWork
εhsj η
j,hsdΦ +
∫
Sj≤JWork
εcolj η
j,coldΦ
C + [K − (1− δ)K] + T + I = F (K,L)
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where
C =
∫
S
c(s)dΦ
T =
∫
Sj=31p,w
tra(s)dΦ
I = κ
∫
Sy,0
ν(ap,1, ε
e
jη
31,ew)κedu(s)dΦ
6. The Aggregate Law of Motion is stationary:
Φ = H(Φ)
The function H is generated by the policy functions a(s), c(s), tra(s), edu(s), the tran-
sition matrix of productivity shocks, Q(ηj, ηj+1), the distribution of K, f(κ;µf,ep , σf,ep)
and transition matrix of innate ability Γ(f, fc).
Notice that the stationarity condition requires that child households are (on average) ’iden-
tical’ to their parents in the sense that they reproduce their parent household’s distribution
once they become parents themselves. This in turn implies that the distribution of transfers
and inheritances that child households receive is consistent with the distribution of transfers
that is actually left by parent households. I present more details about the computational
procedure in the appendix.
5 Parameterization and Calibration
Experiment Design. To measure the extent to which borrowing constraints are binding
and whether they became more binding over time, I compute the strength of borrowing
constraints in two steady-state equilibria. The first equilibrium allocation is calibrated to
be consistent with the US economy at the beginning of the 1980s. More specifically, I target
the size of parental transfers, the college enrolment rate, the correlation of college education
across generations and dropout rates. The resulting allocation is labeled as ’economy 1980’.
In the appendix, I show that the model is also consistent with a series of other empirical
regularities related to college enrolment behavior in the US, which are not used as targets in
the calibration procedure. Between 1980 and 2000, the US economy was characterized by an
increase in the skill premium, larger residual earnings inequality as well as a rise in tuition
fees. I incorporate these developments by changing the respective parameters in the model.
I label the resulting equilibrium allocation as ’economy 2000’. In the following, I describe
the calibration procedure in greater detail.33
33In all my experiments, it is assumed that households have perfect foresight and that the regime change
occurs unexpectedly. These assumptions are standard in the literature, see e.g. Heathcote et al. (2010).
Moreover, the economies 1980 and 2000 are studied at steady-state, the transition between the two steady-
states is not considered. This approach is valid if the changes that occurred between 1980 and 2000 had
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5.1 Economy 1980
I distinguish between parameters that are set outside the model and others that are calibrated
internally.
5.2 Parameters Set Outside of the Model
Technology, Demographics and Preferences. Utility from consumption in each period
is given by u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ . Production follows the aggregate production function F (K,L) =
KαL1−α, where L is aggregate labor measured in efficiency units (see equation 5). By
assumption, college graduates have a skill premium and supply more labor in efficiency
units compared to high school graduates. The skill-premium is independent of the fraction
of high skilled labor.34 I set the capital share in income (α) equal to 0.36, as estimated
by Prescott (1986). Following Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) and Heer (2001), I assume that
capital depreciates at an annual rate of 8 percent. The conditional survival probability ψj
is taken from the National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2004) and refers to the
conditional survival probability for the US population. Only values between age 53 and age
80 are used. I assume that the survival probability is zero for agents at the age of 81. The
survival probability for households younger than 53 years is set equal to 1.35 The preference
parameter γ determines the relative risk aversion and is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. I follow Attanasio et al. (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
who estimate γ using consumption data and find a value of 1.5. This value is well in the
interval of 1 to 3 commonly used in the literature.
Earnings Process. I assume that the process that governs the productivity shocks ηj,e
follows an AR(1) process with persistence parameter ρhs for high school graduates and ρcol
for college graduates. The variance of the innovations are σhs and σcol, respectively. These
parameters are estimated by Hubbard et al. (1995)(HSZ in the following) from the 1982 to
1986 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
sufficient time to affect the behavior of households. This assumption is likely to be fulfilled because the
NLSY97 sample used by Belley and Lochner (2007) includes individuals if they had reached age 21 by
2004. This implies that their parents were between 25 and 30 at the beginning of the 1980s, assuming an
age gap of 30 years. According to the time trends of earnings inequality presented by Krueger and Perri
(2006) and Heathcote et al. (2010), the rise in earnings inequality (both within and between education
groups) began in the early years of the 1980s. Moreover, a substantial share of the total increase between
1980 and 2000 materialized during the 1980s. It thus seems reasonable to assume that the rise in earnings
inequality influenced the behavior of the parents of those households who were surveyed in the NLSY97
almost throughout their entire working life. Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) provide support for this
assumption. The authors analyze the development of the distribution of net worth between 1983 and 2004.
They estimate the structural parameters of their life cycle economy such that the model is consistent with
the distribution of net worth in 1983. They then show that if they increase the variance of residual earnings
inequality and lower the interest rate by a similar magnitude to what I consider here, their model matches
the distribution of net worth observable in the 2004 SCF very well.
34The implicit underlying assumption is that efficiency units supplied by high school and college graduates
are perfect substitutes in the production process. GMV (2010) allow for imperfect substitutability.
35The actual survival probability before 53 is close to 1. See the National Vital Statistics Report.
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They find that high school graduates have a lower earnings persistence and a higher
variance (ρhs = 0.946, σhs = 0.025) compared to college graduates (ρcol = 0.955, σcol =
0.016). Storesletten et al. (2004b) confirm these findings.36
These estimates are based on data from the beginning of the 1980s. However, parental
transfers that occurred in the 1980s originate from savings that were accumulated in the
1970s or even earlier. Since the US economy experienced an increase in residual earnings
inequality between the 1970s and the 1980s, the earnings risk that those parents faced was
lower than indicated by the estimates from Hubbard et al. (1995) for the 1980s.
Gottschalk et al. (1994) show that the permanent and the transitory variances changed
on average by about 40 percent between the 1970s and the 1980s, with a somehow larger
change for high school graduates and a somehow lower change for college graduates. See
Gottschalk et al. (1994), Table 1.
Based on these findings, I reduce the variance of the earnings innovation for college
graduates by 21 percent and by 48 percent for high school graduates. This implies a σhs =
0.0169 for high school graduates and a σcol = 0.013225 for college graduates. The respective
standard deviations are 0.13 and 0.115. The changes are in the range estimated by Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004).
I also take the average age-efficiency profile εej from HSZ, which gives me an estimate
of the college premium for different age groups. The authors find that earnings are more
peaked for college families, which is in line with findings from other empirical studies. By
estimating a fixed-effect model, GMV (2010) propose an alternative way of calibrating the
earnings process.37
College Subsidies. In the model, the government subsidizes college education. Sub-
sidies are decreasing in parental income and asset holdings, such that children from richer
families receive less support. This reflects the financial aid system at US institutions. Col-
leges and universities assign financial aid based on the difference between the cost of attending
and the so-called ”expected family contribution (EFC)”, see Feldstein (1995). The EFC is
computed according to the discretionary income and the available assets of the applicant’s
family. Discretionary income consists of capital and labor income. Available assets are cal-
culated as the difference between current wealth holdings and a wealth level that is deemed
to maintain the current standard of living, which I denote by a¯.
For simplicity and because this specification is common in the literature, I assume that
the fraction of college expenses that is covered by the subsidy is linearly decreasing in the
level of parental resources:
ν = max({ν0 − νasset(max(0, a31p,w − a¯) + (1− τk) ra31p,w)− νlabor (1− τw) εejηj,ew)}, 0) (8)
36It should be noted that the estimates are rather conservative as HSZ use the combined labor income
of the husband and wife (if married) plus unemployment insurance for their estimates. I approximate the
earnings process with a four-state Markov process using the procedure proposed by Tauchen and Hussey
(1991).
37I do not adjust the college premium because it was - at least on average - constant during the 1970s.
The male college premium fell slightly at the beginning of the 1970s and has been increasing since the end
of the 1980s. See Heathcote et al. (2010), Figure 1.
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where ν0, νasset, νlabor ≥ 0. I assume that a¯ is two-thirds of the average wealth level in the
economy. This choice ensures that a substantial fraction of the population has asset holdings
below the threshold. There are three other parameters to be chosen: ν0, νasset and νlabor. ν0
determines the maximum fraction of college expenses that can be covered by the subsidy.
The parameters νasset and νlabor determine how fast this fraction decreases with asset income
and labor income, respectively.
I set ν0 to 0.75. This choice for ν0 is based on the observation that in 1979-1980, even
students from families in the bottom income quintile finance a significant amount of their
college expenses with the help of parental transfers. See the evidence cited in Keane and
Wolpin (2001).38
Feldstein (1995) reports that the implied marginal tax rates on (adjustable) income lies
within 22 and 47 percent, according to the so-called uniform methodology, which was used to
calculate the EFC at the beginning of the 1980s. I choose a value for νasset of 0.2, which is at
the lower end of the spectrum reported by Feldstein (1995). Feldstein (1995) finds that the
implied capital levy by the EFC can be quite high. In a sense the saving distortions implied
by my calibration are expected to be lower on average than the distortions that result from
the US system.
In the data, the share of college expenses that is financed with parental transfers increases
rapidly in level of total parental income Keane and Wolpin (2001).39 This suggests that
college subsidies are actually falling sharply in parental income.40 In order to account for
this feature of the data, without at the same time overly distorting the saving decisions, I
choose different values for νlabor and for νasset. More specifically, I assume that νlabor takes a
value of 0.7.
5.3 Parameters Calibrated Internally
Discount Factor β. In order to calibrate the discount factor β, I target the ratio of
aggregate net worth to aggregate income for the lower 99 % wealth quantile in the US,
which is 3.1 (see Storesletten et al. (2004a)). The result is a β of 0.96. The implied interest
rate is 3.5 percent per annum, which is in the range commonly reported in the literature.
Children’s Weight in Parents’ Utility ς. The parameter ς governs transfer behavior
in the model. It is the intergenerational discount factor and determines the relative weight
38In 1979-80, for youths with families in the bottom income quintile, about 19 percent of college expenses
came from parental transfers. The rest was financed with other internal sources (such as youth’s income,
from which I abstract) or with scholarships, grants or loans. See Keane and Wolpin (2001). Notice that in
my specification, college loans do not count as college subsidies ν. Hence, some students may be able to
finance their total college expenses with the help of external funds.
39Keane and Wolpin (2001) show that parental transfers account for 19 percent of total college expenses
if parents belong to the poorest 25 percent of the population, and 60 percent if parents belong to the richest
75 percent of the population.
40In this context, it is important to notice that the financial aid that a student actually receives in practice
does not necessarily cover the difference between the EFC and the cost of college, as it is implicit in the EFC
procedure. As pointed out by Dick and Edlin (1997), federal programs do not provide enough subsidized aid
to meet the need of all students, and most colleges are not committed to cover the entire residual.
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that parents assign to their children’s utility in their own utility function. In order to
calibrate ς, I target the ratio of intended transfers to aggregate net worth, i.e. transfers that
arise because parents are altruistic in my model. Gale and Scholz (1994) provide information
about intra-family transfers in form of inter-vivos transfers, support for college expenses and
bequest, using the 1983 and the 1986 wave of the SCF. Inter-vivos transfers and support
for college expenses are classified as intended transfers. The flow of both transfer categories
amounts to 0.82 percent of total net worth. Bequests, however, amount to 0.88 percent of
aggregate net worth and are thus quantitatively more important than both other categories
together. The total transfer flow is thus equal to 1.7 percent of total wealth. As noted by
Gale and Scholz (1994), it is not clear whether bequests are intended or unintended, because
there are no markets to insure against uncertainty about lifetime.
I use my model to compute the total amount of bequests that arise because of missing
annuity markets. Given a discount factor β = 0.96, accidental bequests amount to about 0.3
percent of total wealth. This implies that, in order to be consistent with the data, the model
needs to generate intended transfers of 1.4 percent of net worth.41 The resulting value for ς
is 0.7. A ς of 0.7 implies that a parent household discounts the utility of its child household
by 30 percent more than it discounts its on utility. This is in line with results obtained
from Nishiyama (2002) who uses an altruistic framework to explain the observable degree of
wealth inequality in US economy.
Upper Limit Loans χ¯. The maximum amount of loans is calibrated to match the
fraction of households with negative or zero financial assets. Because I do not model collat-
eralized debt, such as mortgages, I use net financial assets, instead of net worth. In 1983,
the fraction of households with negative or zero financial assets was 25 percent (see Table
1, in Wolff (2000)). The resulting borrowing limit corresponds to about 30 percent of aver-
age college expenses for prospective college students. Keane and Wolpin (2001) report that
college students can expect to finance 25 percent of their college expenses with the help of
loans.
Cost of College Education and Dropout Probabilities. Given the choices for the
discount factor β, the intergenerational discount factor ς, the borrowing limit for loans as
well as the college subsidies I am now in the position to calibrate the parameters that govern
the cost of college education as well as the dropout probabilities.
The cost of college education/observable ability K are normally distributed, with den-
sity function f(κ;µf,ep , σf,ep). Recall that in my model, the cost of college education and
observable ability are directly linked. I assume that σf,ep = 1. Innate ability f and parental
education ep thus influence only the mean of the distribution of K, but not the variance.
I further assume that µf,ep consists of two parts, i.e. µf,ep = κ+∆f,edup . κ is the same for
all prospective students and determines the average level of college enrolment, while ∆f,edup
captures the differences in family background and innate ability.
41Recall that the timing of intended transfers not related to college is indeterminate in my model, unless
borrowing constraints are binding. This implies that one could interpret part of the inter-vivos transfers as
bequest.
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f takes two realizations, f ∈ {low, high}. This results in four combinations for ∆f,edup
and for λf,ep . Together with κ¯, there are now nine values which are jointly calibrated.
In order to pin down these parameters, I choose the following nine targets:
• the share of college graduates in the NLSY79, which is 28 percent according to Keane
and Wolpin (2001).
• another four targets are chosen such that the model is consistent with the fact that
enrolment rates increase in AFQT scores, as shown in Belley and Lochner (2007) using
the NLSY79. More specifically, for each of the two bottom ability quartiles, I target
the average of the enrolment rates of the four family income groups reported by Belley
and Lochner (2007). Since differences in enrolment rates between income groups are
small for the bottom AFQT quartiles, averaging provides an accurate description of the
enrolment behavior of all income groups. For the two top AFQT quartiles, differences
in college enrolment rates between rich and poor families are substantial, as shown by
Belley and Lochner (2007)). In these cases, I target the enrolment rates of high income
families only. This group is key for measuring the impact of borrowing constraints, as
it will become clear in the results section.
• the last four targets are the college dropout probabilities for different quartiles of
observable scholastic ability, as reported by Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010).42
The choice of these targets ensures that the model is consistent with two patterns in the
data, where college enrolment rates are increasing and dropout rates are falling in measured
ability.
With the parameters presented in Table 2, the model is consistent with these patterns.
As Table 2 shows, the model fits the data closely.
Additional assumptions are needed in oder to identify λ and ∆. The reason is that a
priori it is not clear how the combinations of innate ability and parental education map
into the different observable ability quartiles. I thus assume that ∆low,hs ≥ ∆low,col ≥
∆high,hs ≥ ∆high,col and λlow,hs ≥ λlow,col ≥ λhigh,hs ≥ λhigh,col. This is equivalent to saying
that innate ability has more influence on the costs and benefits of college, compared to
parental education. I will also make use of this assumption in the next section to calibrate
Γ.
Intergenerational Transmission of Innate Abilities. The intergenerational trans-
mission of innate ability is governed by a 2x2 transition matrix Γ.
42Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010) use the students’ SAT score as a measure for academic ability. Depending
the test score, they divide their sample (which is taken from the Beginning Postsecondary Student Longi-
tudinal Survey (BPS 1995/96)) into four groups, where each group contains between 15 and 35 percent of
the total number of students in their sample (see their Table 2 on page 22). They find that degree com-
pletion rates are increasing with the level of the test scores. They report that the degree completion rates
for the four groups are 0.659, 0.7627, 0.8462 and 0.8825. The dropout rates are the complements of these
numbers. When computing the degree completion rates, they control for students who do not put effort but
simply enroll and dropout shortly after. Since I target the dropout rates for four different ability quartiles,
I interpolate the data from Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010) to compute in-between values.
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For a given level of parental education, Γ determines how strongly educational achieve-
ments are correlated between generations. If the matrix Γ is identical to the identity matrix,
children will inherit the same level as their parents. If Γ is instead given by a matrix where
all elements on the antidiagonal are equal to one, children and parents are of the opposite
type.
Using the NLSY79, Keane and Wolpin (2001) report that parents who have a college
degree are 40 percent more likely to have children that are college educated as well, compared
to high school educated parents. This suggests that the transmission of f is somewhere in-
between the two extremes. I thus assume that Γ is given by a convex combination of an
identity matrix and a matrix where all elements on the antidiagonal are equal to one. A
new parameter $ is introduced, which determines the weight of identity matrix in this linear
combination. Intuitively, the role of this parameter is to shift probability mass to the main
diagonal and to make the transmission of ability more persistent. See Castaneda et al. (2003)
for a similar approach.
Additional Moments. In the appendix, I show that the model is consistent with other
moments that were not used as targets in the calibration procedure. I present empirical facts
that are informative about the trade-offs that are relevant for the college enrolment decision.
In particular, I document that (i) the distribution of measured ability is skewed to the right,
as in the data (see e.g. GMV 2010), (ii) the implied average college expenses are in line
with the data, (iii) the model is consistent with differences in tuition expenses with respect
to ability, as documented McPherson and Schapiro (2002), and that (iv) the model is line
with empirical findings regarding the sensitivity of college enrolment to changes in tuition,
as reported by Dynarski (2003). Given the complexity of the college enrolment decision, it is
reassuring that my baseline calibration is able to reproduce these moments as well. Further
empirical validation is provided in the next section, where I compute the average enrolment
gap in the model, following Carneiro and Heckman (2002). Before doing so, I outline the
calibration of the economy 2000.
5.4 Economy 2000
Between 1980 and 2000, the US economy was characterized by an increase in the skill pre-
mium, higher residual earnings inequality as well as a rise in tuition fees. In this section,
I discuss how I adjust the parameter values such that the model is consistent with these
changes.
Increase in College Premium. Heathcote et al. (2010), Figure 1, report that the
college wage premium for men rose by about 40 percentage points between the beginning of
the 1980s and 2000. This is in line with other estimates in the literature, see for example
Katz and Autor (1999). The increase in the college premium is implemented by shifting the
life cycle earnings profile of college graduates up, while the mean average earnings of high
school graduates is kept constant, also see Heathcote et al. (2010).
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Increase in Earnings Uncertainty. I assume that the residual earnings variance
increases from 0.0169 to 0.025 for high school graduates and from 0.0132 to 0.016 for college
graduates. These are the original estimates from HSZ, provided for the 1980s. This was
the time when parents accumulated their saving for college investment undertaken at the
end of the 1990s. Clearly, the variance of residual earnings continued to increase during the
1990s as well (see e.g. Krueger and Perri (2006) and Heathcote et al. (2010)), so my choice
is rather conservative.
Increase in Tuition Fees. Between 1980 and 2000, tuition fees doubled in real-terms,
see Collegeboard (2005). I adjust κ from 2.6 to 5.2, which raises the average tuition fees by
90 percent, relative to average income.
Borrowing Limit for College Loans χ¯. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010) report
that cumulative Stafford loan limits remained almost identical in real-terms between the
beginning of the 1980 and 2000 (see their Figure 1). To keep borrowing limits constant, I
adjust χ¯ to 1.25.
The parameter choices for the economy 2000 are summarized in Table 3.
6 Results
I present the results in the following order: First, I show that the enrolment pattern in the
economy 1980 are broadly in line with the data. In particular, the results are consistent with
an average enrolment gap of 8 percent, as computed by Carneiro and Heckman (2002). I then
compute the fraction of borrowing constrained households with the help of a counterfactual
experiment, in which I relax the borrowing limit. I find that 24 percent of all households are
borrowing constrained in their college education. I then proceed with the economy 2000. I
show that my model is consistent with the widening of the enrolment gaps that are visible in
the data. Interestingly, I find that the fraction of borrowing constrained households declined
over the course of time, from 24 percent to 18 percent.
6.1 Economy 1980
College Enrolment Rates in the Data and in the Model. I start by comparing the
college enrolment rates produced by the benchmark calibration to their empirical counter-
parts. Figure 2 is taken from Belley and Lochner (2007) (Figure 2a in their paper) and
depicts the college enrolment rate for different levels of observable ability and family income.
Figure 4 shows the corresponding rates that are generated by the model.
Model and data coincide with respect to the main trends. Both figures show that (i)
college enrolment rates are increasing in observable ability, (ii) college enrolment rates are
increasing in family income, and (iii) the gap in college enrolment rates between students
from rich and from poor families are increasing in observable ability. The first two pattern
were used as targets in the calibration procedure, but not the third.
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It should be noted that, compared to the data, the model overstates the size of the college
enrolment gap between children from rich and poor families for more able children and it
understates the enrolment gap for the less able. What is important in the context of this
paper is that on average, the enrolment gap is in line with the empirical evidence.43 In
the next section, I follow the methodology of Carneiro and Heckman (2002) to compute the
average enrolment gap.
Reproducing Carneiro and Heckman (2002). Carneiro and Heckman (2002) present
a method to compute the fraction of the population that is financially constrained in their
college decision. Their method has become the standard tool to address the question of bind-
ing borrowing constraints, see for example Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and more recently
Bohacek and Kapicka (2010).
Carneiro and Heckman (2002)) use the NLSY79 and compute the fraction of borrowing
constrained households with the help of the following steps. First, they divide their sample
by parents’ income quartiles and children’s ability terciles, using AFQT test scores as a
proxy for ability. They assume that youth with parents in the highest income quartile are
not borrowing constrained. Second, the college enrolment gaps for each ability and income
group with respect to the unconstrained income quartile are computed. The fraction of the
population that is borrowing constrained is equal to the average enrollment gap across all
groups, which can be computed using population weights.
As pointed out by Carneiro and Heckman (2002), even after controlling for ability, family
income still seems to play an important role for college enrolment. This is also the message
of Figure 4. However, as argued by the authors, family resources are likely to produce many
skills which are not fully captured by a single test score. Moreover, family income at the
time when students take their college decision is strongly correlated with family income
throughout the life cycle.
Carneiro and Heckman thus introduce additional measures for early family background
factors, such as parental education, family structure and place of residence. They find that
enrolment gaps become considerably smaller, after controlling for long-run effects properly.
They conclude that at most 8 percent of the population is financially constraint in their
college decision.
I replicate their method, using the distribution of households which is generated by
my benchmark calibration.44 Without controlling for long-run factors other than measured
ability, the average enrolment gap 0.17. Clearly, the magnitude of the average enrolment gap
reflects the sizable enrolment gaps that are visible in Figure 4. I then additionally control
for parental education, which also determines scholastic ability, but which is only partially
incorporated in the result of test scores. I find that after doing so, the average enrolment
gap is much smaller, about 7 percent. Put differently, according to the methodology of
Carneiro and Heckman (2002), 7 percent of the population in the benchmark economy is
43This means that the discrepancies between model and data cannot be responsible for the difference
between the actual fraction of borrowing constrained households and the average enrolment gap.
44To be consistent with the rest of my analysis, I group households according to quartiles of measured
ability, not terciles, as Carneiro and Heckman (2002)
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financially constrained in their college decision. This result is perfectly in line with Carneiro
and Heckman’s result from the NLSY79.
Borrowing Constraints. In this section, I compute the fraction of households that
would have enrolled in college, if access to credit had been unlimited, given the interest rate
in the initial steady- state. I thus increase the upper limit on loans, χ¯ from 1 to 5.2. 5.2
is the natural borrowing limit, given the market clearing interest rate that results from the
benchmark calibration in 1980.45
The rise in college enrolment following the removal of borrowing limits is substantial:
the fraction of college student increases from 36 percent to about 60 percent. This implies
that 24 percent of the population were borrowing constrained in their college decision in the
benchmark calibration. The fraction of college graduates also increases significantly, from
28 percent to 44 percent.
Strikingly, the fraction of borrowing constrained households resulting from the counter-
factual experiment is more than three times as large as the average enrolment gap computed
in the previous section. To understand this discrepancy, notice that the average enrolment
gap identifies the fraction of borrowing constrained households if the following two assump-
tions are satisfied:
1. Youth with parents in the top income quartile are not financially constrained in their
college enrolment decision.
2. In the absence of financial constraints, college enrolment rates are equal for all income
groups (after controlling for observable ability).
Even small violations of the first assumption may lead to a large discrepancy between
actual fraction of borrowing constrained households and the average enrolment gap, as the
following examples shows.46 Suppose that the second assumption is satisfied. Further sup-
pose that relaxing borrowing limits increases the college enrolment rate of youth from rich
families by 1 percentage point, independent of the ability level. This increase adds a frac-
tion of 1 percentage point of constrained households to all other income groups. This is
because when the average enrolment gap is computed, the difference with respect to the top
income quartile is taken. In total, the average enrolment gap underestimates the fraction of
borrowing constrained households by 4 percentage points in this example.47
A comparison of Figures 4 and 5 reveals that relaxing borrowing constraints increases
enrolment rates for the top income quartile by up to 11 percentage points. This shows
45The natural borrowing limit denotes the maximum amount of debt that a household can borrow, such
that debt is serviced even in the worst income state resulting from the income process of high school graduates.
The income of high school graduates is relevant even for the decision about college enrolment because of the
possibility of dropping out, in which case households receive the income process of high school graduates.
46I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
47Notice that when computing the Figures, I do not control for parental education because I want to be
consistent with the Belley and Lochner (2007). This will be important in the next section, where I compare
the changes in enrolment behavior over time. The enrolment rates after controlling for parental education
are reported in Table 6. As can be seen from there, the qualitative results in this section remain unchanged.
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that even rich parents fail to provide enough resources to their offspring, due to the fact
that intergenerational borrowing is not permitted and altruism is only one-sided. One-sided
altruism implies that even rich parents face a trade-off between saving and transferring
resources to their children. In particular, parents save for their retirement and also for
precautionary reasons, since they face another 15 years of earnings uncertainty.
With respect to the second assumption, it is interesting to notice that enrolment rates
are not equal for all income groups after borrowing limits have been relaxed (see Figure
5). In particular, enrolment rates for the poor are higher for some ability groups than the
respective rate in the top income quartile.
This finding can be explained as follows. The decision to attend college depends on the
tuition costs as well as on the dropout risk. All other things equal, the cost of attending
college are lower for youth from poor families, because they receive financial aid. The dropout
risk instead depends on innate ability as well as the level of parental education. Children
with college educated parents are more likely to enrol in college, all other things equal.
Hence, the share of college educated parents in the top income quartile relative to the other
quartiles determines the income gradient of college enrolment. The higher the concentration
of college educated parents in the top income group, the steeper the income gradient.
I report the fraction of college graduates in different subgroups of the population in Table
7. The smallest fraction of college graduated parents in the top income quartile, absolute and
also relative to other income groups, can be found for children in the lowest ability quartile.
This explains why the enrolment gradient is relatively flat for children in this group (see
Figure 4).
It also explains why enrolment rates increase more for low ability youth with poor parents
compared to their counterparts who have rich parents, after borrowing constraints have been
removed (compare Figure 4 and Figure 5). Children in the bottom ability quartile face high
costs of attending college. Within this group, children from poor families are more willing
to attend college than children with rich parents, since they receive need-based aid. Because
intergenerational borrowing is prohibited, poor parents are not willing or not able to provide
sufficient resources to finance their offspring’s education, even if attending college is cheap.
In recent work, Brown et al. (2011) provide empirical support for my finding that many
parents are not willing or not able to invest efficiently in their offspring’s education. The
authors estimate that about half of the children in their sample are potentially constrained
in their college outcome. They identify parents who are unwilling (or unable) to meet their
expected financial contribution as those who do not provide post-schooling transfers to their
children. Brown et al. (2011) find that financial aid affects the educational attainment of
those children whose parents do not make post-schooling transfers, while it does not have
an impact on the schooling attainment of those who receive post-schooling transfers.
To summarize, because intergenerational borrowing is prevented, some of the rich fam-
ilies and poor parents with children in the bottom ability quartile fail to provide sufficient
resources to their offspring. As a result, the fraction of households that would like to attend
college if they could borrow against their future earnings exceeds the average enrolment gap
by a factor of three. The fact that I model the intergenerational transmission of wealth and
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ability explicitly allows me to identify the subgroups in the population for which borrowing
constraints are binding.48 This approach is an important contribution with respect to the
previous literature, in which the income gradient of college enrolment rates is taken as a
measure for borrowing constraints, as in, for example, Ellwood and Kane (2000), Cameron
and Heckman (1998) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002), or in which the parental transfer
function was specified in reduced form, as in Keane and Wolpin (2001).
6.2 Economy 2000
The previous section has shown that the model is broadly consistent with the enrolled pat-
terns that were observable in the US economy at the beginning of the 1980s. Ellwood and
Kane (2000) and Belley and Lochner (2007) document that the enrolment gaps between rich
and poor families became larger over time. The enrolment rates that Belley and Lochner
(2007) computed from the NLSY79 and the NLSY97 are shown in Figure 2 and 3. In this
section, I analyze whether my model is consistent with the changing role of family income
in determining college entry. This is done by comparing the enrolment rates of the economy
1980 and of the economy 2000. In a second step, I then compute the fraction of households
that is borrowing constrained in their college decision in the economy 2000. I find that a
share of 18 percent of the population is borrowing constrained. This means that the fraction
of constrained households decreased over time.
Enrolment Gaps. In Figures 4 and 6, I plot the enrolment rates for the economy 1980
and the economy 2000, respectively. A comparison reveals that family income is much more
important in determining enrolment rates in the economy 2000 than it is in the economy
1980, conditional on observable ability. This is in line with the empirical findings by Belley
and Lochner (2007). Interestingly, the income gradient increases more for youth in the lowest
ability quartile, both in the data and in the model. For all other ability groups, the model
generates enrolment gap that are too big compared to the data.
Share of College Graduates. It is worth emphasizing that the fraction of college
graduates rises from 28 percent to 36 percent if we move from the economy 1980 to the
economy 2000. This is consistent with the reported increase in the data (Census Bureau
2004).49
Borrowing Constraints. In order to measure the fraction of borrowing constrained
households, I conduct the following experiment. I set χ¯ to the highest possible value, which
48It should be noted that for some subgroups of the population, borrowing constraints are ’less binding’
than predicted by the average enrolment gap. Otherwise, the fraction of constrained households would be
even higher.
49Moreover, the model generates a fall in the real interest rate of almost 1 percentage point, from 3.5
percent in 1980 to 2.7 percent in 2000. See Table 5. Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) and the references
therein who also find that the real interest rate fell between 1 and 2 percentage points in the period under
consideration.
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in this case is χ¯ = 4.9.50 The interest rate is kept fix at 2.7 percent per annum. As result,
the share of households that enrol in college increases by 18 percentage points (see Table 5).
This result implies that the fraction of households that is borrowing constrained in their
college decision actually decreased over time, from 24 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2000.
This result is striking, given the fact that family income has become more important over
time as a determinant of college entry. The latter finding has given rise to concerns that
today, borrowing constraints are binding for a larger fraction of the population than two
decades ago, see Ellwood and Kane (2000), Belley and Lochner (2007) and Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo (2010). These concerns are intuitive, in particular against the background
that in the US, tuition became more expensive and earnings inequality increased during the
same period. The remainder of this section will be devoted to clarify why enrolment gaps
and the share of the population affected by financial constraints developed in the opposite
direction.
To understand why the fraction of constrained households declined over time, compare
the enrolment rates for with and without borrowing limits for the two economies (Figures
4 and 5 for the economy 1980 and Figures 6 and 7 for the economy 2000). The striking
difference between the economy 1980 and 2000 is that the enrolment rates of the rich do
not rise if borrowing conditions are relaxed. Borrowing constraints are not binding anymore
for the income-rich in the the economy 2000. This is in sharp contrast to the economy in
1980, where even youth from affluent families turned out to be financially constrained in
their college decision.
There are three channels that explain these enrolment patterns: the increase in income
inequality, a compositional effect and the fact that enrolling in college is more risky in the
economy 2000 compared to the economy 1980. They are outlined in greater detail in the
following.
Increase in inequality. The rise in earnings inequality, both within and between educa-
tion groups, benefits parents in the upper income quartile in the sense that their income
rises relative to the average income. Because parents are altruistic, this translates into an
increase in financial support to their children. Therefore, the intergenerational borrowing
limit becomes less binding. As a consequence, the share of constrained children coming from
rich families falls, and the enrolment rate among youth from this group goes up, relative to
the average.
Compositional effect. The increase in the college premium also changes the educational
composition of high-income families. The fraction of college education parents in the top
income quartile rises. Consider Table 7, where I report the fraction of college graduates in the
different ability/income quartiles for the economies 1980 and 2000. The top income quartile
in the economy 2000 consists almost exclusively of college graduated parents, independently
of the ability of children. The change with respect to the economy 1980 is most drastic
50Notice that the natural borrowing limit for the economy 2000 is stricter than for the 1980 economy
because of the increase in earnings risk, which results in a lower level of the worst income state. Consequently,
the maximum amount of debt a household is able to repay in the worst state is lower as well.
32
for the lowest ability quartile, where only 46 percent of parents have a college degree in the
economy 1980.51 This compositional effect is important because children of college graduates
are more likely to be successful in college, which tightens the observable link between family
income and college enrolment. This is particularly true for low ability children, as the
compositional effect is most pronounced for this group. Ellwood and Kane (2000) provide
empirical evidence for the fact that the educational composition of income-rich households
indeed changed over time. They show that the likelihood that income-rich households are at
the same time better educated increased over the last decades. Their analysis also reveals
that the fraction of college graduates in the top quartile of the income distribution rose by
more than the average.
Increase in financial risk associated with college attendance. College education became
more expensive over time. There is some probability that students drop out of college without
graduating. If they dropout, the return from college is negative, because students bear the
cost, but do not receive a benefit in exchange. Therefore, the decision to enrol in college
can be seen as the decision to accept a gamble. An increase in tuition lowers the certainty
equivalence associated with this gamble.52
The risk of loosing money cannot be avoided by borrowing, since college loans need to be
repaid in full, independently of whether college was completed successfully or not (Chatterjee
and Ionescu (2010)). This means that in the economy 2000, young households who face a
high risk of dropping out are less willing to borrow in order to finance college compared to
the economy 1980. Since children of high-school educated parents are on average less likely
to complete college successfully, this explains why college enrolment rates do not change
much for children from low income households in the economy 2000 once I relax borrowing
constraints. Interestingly, the increase in financial risk implied by the rise in tuition fees
reinforces the compositional channel outlined above.
To summarize, this section has shown how important it is to model the transmission of
wealth and ability between parents and children in order to account for the changing role
of family income in determining college entry. In the next section, I shed more light on the
role that parental education plays for determining college enrolment.
6.3 The Role of Parental Education
In this section, I shed more light on the role of parental education. Parental education
is commonly seen as a key determinant of children’s college enrolment behavior (see e.g.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002)). On the one hand, parental education serves as a good proxy
for children’s pre-college ability.53 On the other hand, education also determines the average
51The fraction of college graduates is, all other things equal, lower for lower ability groups because of the
positive correlation between parental education and children’s ability.
52In addition, the benefit of attending became more risky over time due the increase in earnings risk.
53In the model section above, some theories that imply a positive correlation between parental education
and children’s academic ability are summarized.
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life time income of households. College educated parents thus have on average a higher
lifetime income than high school educated parents (see e.g. Hubbard et al. (1994)). All
other things equal, this may imply that children of college educated parents receive more
transfers, which makes it easier for them to finance college.
The implications of these two channels for the measurement of college enrolment gaps
are studied in this section. In this context, I also compare the extent to which the life cycle
savings pattern generated by the model match with data.
Parental Education as a Proxy for Pre-College Ability. There is a debate in the
literature about whether controlling for parental education and other variables improves the
ability of the average college enrolment gap to measure the fraction of borrowing constrained
households (see Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Kane (2006)).54
My model can be used to clarify the role that parental education plays in that context.
Parental education determines the academic ability of children. Children of college educated
parents are more likely to achieve better test scores, and are less likely to leave college without
a degree. In the following, I label this relationship as the ’ability channel’. Ignoring this
channel when calculating the enrolment gaps overstates the influence of parental resources -
this is the point of Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
Parental education is also an important determinant of parental saving and transfer
behaviour. This can be seen from Figure 8, where I plot the life cycle profile of net worth for
college and high school educated households. College educated households have, on average,
richer at the time their children go to college. They also transfer, on average, more resources
to their offspring, as indicated by the drop in net worth that occurs at the age of 52. The
change in net worth is much more pronounced for college educated households than for
households with a high school degree. In the next section, I describe this pattern in greater
detail.
Because lifetime income of college educated parents is on average higher than lifetime
income of their high school educated counterparts, college graduates have a higher utility gain
from transferring resources to their offspring. All other things equal, children with college
educated parents are more likely to receive support from their parents than other children.
This however also means that they are, ceteris paribus, also more likely to attend college.
I call differences in parental transfer behavior the ’transfer channel’. Ignoring the transfer
channel when computing the enrolment gap understates the role of parental resources - this
is the point of Kane (2006). In fact, the transfer channel may contribute to explaining
54Carneiro and Heckman (2002) write: ”Family income in the adolescent years is strongly correlated with
family income throughout the life cycle. In addition, long run family resources are likely to produce many
skills that are not fully captured by a single test score. When we control for early family background factors
(parental education, family structure and place of residence) we greatly weaken the relationship between
family income and college enrolment.” (p. 721). Kane (2006) writes: ”However, to the extent that parents
can help finance their children’s education with current income or accumulated assets, the distinction between
short-term constraints and long-term constraints is unclear. Indeed, we may be understating the effect of
borrowing constraints by first conditioning on test performance, to the extent that these factors, too, are
related to long-term family wealth” (p. 1394).
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the difference between the average enrolment gap and the fraction of borrowing constrained
households.
Separating the ability from the transfer channel is not straightforward because the two
are intertwined: college educated parents have more able children, meaning that college
investment costs less and promises a higher return, hence college educated parents transfer
more resources to their children.
My model can be used to quantify the role of each of the two channels on the size of the
average enrolment gap. In the following, I focus on the economy 1980. The difference between
the college enrolment gap before and after controlling for parental education measures the
joint impact of the ability and the transfer channel. In the baseline calibration, the average
enrolment gap without controlling for parental education is 17 percent. If I control for
parental education, the enrolment gap shrinks to 7 percent (see Table 4). That is, controlling
for the ability channel and the transfer channel jointly decreases the enrolment gap by 10
percentage points.
I now conduct an experiment that allows me to measure the relative contribution of the
transfer channel. I shut down the ability channel in the economy 1980 by setting $ to
0.5, which implies that innate ability is not transmitted from parents to children anymore.
Moreover, I modify cost of college education ∆ and the dropout probability λ such that the
cost and return of attending college are independent of parental education.55 In this experi-
ment, only the transfer channel is operative. The average enrolment gap - after conditioning
on measured ability but without conditioning on parental education - is about 9 percent
(see Table 4). So it is about half of its value compared to the benchmark calibration. If
I additionally control for parental college education, the average enrolment gap shrinks to
about 6 percent. This corresponds to a decline of 3 percentage points, which can be seen as
a measure for the strength of the transfer channel. This indicates that the transfer channel
on its own is significantly weaker than the joint interaction between the transfer channel and
the ability channel. The transfer channel thus makes only a small contribution to explaining
the high fraction of households that is borrowing constrained.
Average Assets by Age. As the previous section made clear, differences in savings
and transfers between high school graduates and college graduates are an important margin
in the model. Aim of this section is to discuss the empirical relevance of the life cycle
profiles of asset holdings that are plotted in Figure 8. I focus on the following three stages of
the life cycle: beginning (young households enter into the economy), transfer stage (young
households become parents and provide transfers to their children) and pre-retirement stage.
At the beginning of their life cycle, young households, on average, start their economic life
with positive wealth holdings. In particular college graduates own a substantial amount of
wealth at the beginning of the life cycle which is used to cover tuition fees and consumption
during college education. Between age 26 and 48, the average asset holdings of college
graduates are actually lower than average asset holdings of high school graduates. While
55The new choices for ∆ and λ are now given by ∆f=high = 0.4, ∆f=low = −0.85, and λf=high = 0.2,
∆f=low = 0.52. Notice that ∆ and λ only depend on innate abilities. Parental education does not matter
anymore.
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this implication of the model is at odds with the data (see e.g. Hubbard et al. (1994) and
Hubbard et al. (1995)), it is consistent with the differences in the shape of earnings profiles
between high school and college graduates. See Hubbard et al. (1994), Figures 2b and 2c,
and Hubbard et al. (1995) for a similar result.56 The life cycle earnings profile of college
graduates is more hump-shaped. Hence, college graduates save less and borrow more when
young in order to smooth out their consumption profile over the life cycle.57
At the age of 51, young households become parents and provide transfers to their children.
At this stage of the life cycle, Figure 8 shows two facts that are interesting. First, prior to
the point when transfers are made, college educated households own more assets than high
school educated households. Second, after transfers have been made, the wealth of college
educated parents declines by more than the wealth of high school educated parents.
The first observation can be explained by the fact that college graduates have stronger
incentives to save for their offspring’s education. They know that their children are more
likely to attend college, as they are more able than the children of high school graduates. If I
shut down the link between parental education and children’s ability, as I did in the previous
subsection, I find that difference in savings between college and high school educated parents
disappears (see Figure 9). Put differently, if children’s ability is independent of their parents
education, parental saving for inter-vivos transfers are also independent of education.
The second observation, namely the drop in assets following transfers, is due to the
’transfer channel’ outlined above. College educated parents have, on average, a higher life
time income. Consequently, they provide on average more transfers to their children. This
means that college educated households dissave more than high school educated households,
in oder to finance the transfers. In the next subsection, I analyze to what extent these
predications of the model are in line with evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
Third, close to retirement, college graduates hold more assets compared to high school
graduates. As pointed out by Hubbard et al. (1994), the life cycle asset profile of college
graduates is more hump-shaped in the data as well.58 In my model, the fact that high
school graduates save relatively less for retirement follows from the fact that pension benefits
are independent of lifetime income, implying that retirement income accounts for a bigger
fraction of the total income of high school graduates, as compared to the total income of
college graduates. See Huggett and Ventura (2000) and Storesletten et al. (2004a) who show
that a key feature of the US social security system is that annual benefits are not proportional
to social security taxes paid previously.
Further Empirical Evidence on Parental Transfers and Saving . In this section,
56Since the earnings profiles I use for my quantitative analysis are take from Hubbard et al. (1994) and
Hubbard et al. (1995), this is to be expected.
57Hubbard et al. (1994) show that introducing a consumption floor and an asset-based means tested social
security system suppresses the savings of high school graduates and helps to reconcile the model with the
empirical evidence. I leave the interesting question how a consumption floor and asset based means tested
social security programs interact with saving for transfers for future research. I expect that introducing these
features into my model will boost the fraction of households that is financially constrained in their college
decision because they reduce the incentive to save.
58Hubbard et al. (1994) abstract from borrowing and therefore focus on assets only.
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I shed more light on the empirical relevance of some patterns that are produced by the model.
At the stage when transfers occur in the model, college educated parents save less and provide
more transfers to their children compared to high school educated parents. In the previous
section, I showed that these findings are caused by differences in parental lifetime income
(’transfer channel’) and by differences in children’s academic ability (’ability channel’). The
ability channel turned out to be more important for determining college enrolment.
In order to evaluate to what extent there are similar pattern in the data, I use the
1983-86 panel of Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). In 1986, extensive information about
households’ transfer behavior was collected. The 1983-86 panel has therefore become a
standard reference with respect to parental inter-vivos transfers (see e.g. Gale and Scholz
(1994)). I compute total transfers given by a household as the sum of all monetary transfers
and college expenses, which are reported separately in the SCF.59 I use savings in constant
prices accumulated between 1983 and 1986. In order to be consistent with the model, I
consider only those households that are between 45 and 55 years old and that have at least
one child.
College graduated parents have on average higher savings compared to high school grad-
uated parents, see panel 1, column 3 of Table 8. The result is not statistically significant,
however. Panel 2 of Table 8 reveals that college graduates also transfer more to their children.
This result is statistically significant.
The decision to save may be strongly influenced by current income realizations, as the life
cycle hypothesis would predict. In column 4 of Table 8, I thus additionally control for current
income. Moreover, in column 5, I control for current income and wealth, where wealth
can be seen as a proxy for past income realizations. Any difference in transfer or saving
behavior of parents is now solely due to the transfer channel and/or the ability channel.
Interestingly, independently of whether I control for wealth and income or for income only,
I find that college graduates save less and transfer more to their children compared to high
school graduates. A possible interpretation of this finding is that for a given wealth and
income level, college educated parents foresee on average high income in the future and
are thus more willing to provide more resources to their offspring. According to Hubbard
et al. (1995), the income difference between college graduates and high school graduates is
particularly pronounced in the years before retirement.60
Children of college graduates are on average more able and thus also more likely to attend
college. My model predicts that in the absence of this ability link, behavioral differences
between college graduated parents and high school graduated parents become smaller. The
SCF does not contain information about children’s ability. Given this constraint, I include
in column 6 of Table 8 only households who had at least one child in college between 1983
and 1986. I expect that observable ability differences between children become smaller once
I control for college attendance.
Strikingly, controlling for college attendance of children renders the estimated saving and
59The 1986 SCF reports monetary transfers only if the transfer amount is above 3000 US-Dollar.
60An alternative explanation could be that retirement benefits are tied to labor income, which would imply
that college graduates receive higher pension benefits compared to high school graduates. I am grateful to
an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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transfer gap insignificant. This hints to the fact that the ability channel is more relevant in
determining parental transfers, which confirms the conclusion I reached above for the model.
It is important to stress that this does not constitute a formal test, since there are
potentially many alternative explanations that are consistent with the patterns documented
in this section. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that the model’s prediction about the
joint behavior of transfers and saving appear to be qualitatively consistent with the data,
given that most of the literature has focused on difference in saving alone (see e.g. Hubbard
et al. (1995) or Dynan et al. (2004)).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the driving forces behind the changing role of family income
in determining college entry. Moreover, I have studied to what extent the average enrolment
gap is informative about the fraction of borrowing constrained households.
In order to do so, I have developed an incomplete markets model that features parental
altruism and an educational choice. My model allowed me to study the behavioral adjust-
ments of parental transfers following from changes in the economic environment that have
occurred in the US economy over the last 30 years, in particular, the increase in earnings
inequality (between and within education groups).
My results show that the increase in earnings inequality is key for explaining the increase
in the college enrolment gap between youth from rich and from poor families. Interestingly,
my model indicates that the changing role of family income is not due to a larger fraction
of households that is borrowing constrained in their college choice. Actually, it turns out
that the opposite is the case: the fraction of households that is borrowing constrained in
their college decision decreased from 25 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to about 20
percent in 2000. In general, the share of borrowing constrained households is much larger
than indicated by the average enrolment gap, which is only 7 percent in 1980.
An important extension of my model would be to model the determiants of academic
ability more carefully. Mainly for simplicity, I assumed that children’s ability is partly de-
termined by parental education, and partly by innate ability, which is also partly inherited
from parents. I will leave it for future research to replace this reduced form with a more
structural approach, in which early education is explicitly taken into account. By extending
my model in this direction one could, for example, investigate how (intergenerational) bor-
rowing constraints at various stages in the life cycle interact. This result would be important
for the design of optimal education policies.
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8 Appendix I: Additional Empirical Validation
The distribution of observable ability in my model implies a certain distribution of tuition.
The distribution of tuition, in turn, is key for explaining college enrolment rates as well as
the fraction of borrowing constrained households. In this section, I present a number of
stylized facts related to college enrolment behavior. I argue that my quantitative model is
consistent with these facts.
Skewness of the Observable Ability Distribution. The distribution of measured
ability levels that results from these parameter choices is skewed to the right, with a median
(-3.15) which is smaller than the mean (-2.9). Right-skewness of skills is often found in
empirical work, see for example GMV (2010), who compute the distribution of AFQT results
in the NLSY.
Average Direct Cost of College Education. The average amount students pay in
the model (based on their measured ability), relative to GDP per capita, is 2.1. Notice that
this is for four-years of education, before need-based financial aid is subtracted.
The respective ratio in the data is 1.7. This takes into account the average yearly fees
for tuition, room and board charged by 4-year institutions (public and private), which was
approximately 5000 Dollar at the beginning of the 1980s (in current Dollars of 1980) (see
the Digest of Educational Statistics). GDP per capita was about 12 000 Dollars (current
prices) in 1980 (see World Bank Economic Indicators).
Distribution of direct cost of college education. I now turn to the distribution
of direct cost that prospective students face. McPherson and Schapiro (2006) report that
100 points more in the SAT score lower total tuition fees by between 500 to 2300 Dollars.
According to Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010), the difference between the 30th percentile and
the 65th percentile in the distribution of SAT scores is exactly 200 points. That means that
students at the 65th percentile of the distribution of observable abilities pay between 8 and
about 40 percent less than students at the 30th percentile, measured in terms of per-capita
GDP. In my model, the respective difference is 50 percent. The distribution of SAT scores is
highly non-linear (see Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010)). The same applies to the distribution
of observable abilities in the model. A comparison of percentiles that are further apart thus
becomes increasingly difficult. It is interesting to note that the fraction of the population
that faces tuition costs of zero or less is small (less than 1 percent). Generous scholarships
at many US schools are typically reserved to the top 1 percent of the applicant pool.
Sensitivity of college enrolment to tuition. Dynarski (2003) estimates that subsi-
dizing college with an additional 1000 Dollars (in 1998 Dollars) increases college enrolment
by about 4 percentage points. I find that giving an equivalent amount to college students
in the benchmark calibration raises college enrolment by 3.5 percentage points. In line with
empirical evidence, I also find that the response to changes in tuition decreases with family
income. I thus conclude that the model describes the sensitivity of college enrolment with
respect to changes in tuition well.
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9 Appendix II: Solution Algorithm
I solve the quantitative model using a nested fixed point algorithm. The outer loop searches
for a fixed point in the interest rate, while the inner loop solves the dynamic program given
by (1) - (7) as described in the next section. The inner loop solves the hybrid model which
nests both the pure life cycle economy and a model with infinitely lived dynasties as special
cases. The hybrid nature of the model manifests itself in the fact that the parental value
function Vp,w(s
31
p,w) contains the discounted future utility of the child and vice versa. I follow
the Laitner (2001) when solving this problem. I start with a guess for the parental value
function, V ′p,w(s
31
p,w). Given this guess, I solve the child’s problem as specified in (5), (4),
(6) and (7). I describe the solution technique in greater detail in the next section. I then
compute an update for the parental value function, V ′′p,w(s
31
p,w). I keep on repeating this
process until convergence is achieved.61
9.1 Computing the Decision Rules
I compute the optimal decision rules for consumption and saving by adapting the ’endogenous
grid point method’ (EGM), first outlined by Carroll (2006).62 The EGM derives the optimal
choices based on inverting the first-order conditions, for a given grid of tomorrow’s asset
choices. As a result, a grid of corresponding optimal asset levels for today’s problem arises.63
Different from ’standard’ dynamic programming problems, the program specified by (1)
- (7) contains a discrete choice, namely the education decision. The presence of a dis-
crete choice may generate kinks in the parental value function Vp,w(s
31
p,w), leading to non-
differentiable and non-concave parts. Only young households who receive transfers above a
certain threshold are be able to attend college. This in turn implies that only parents whose
wealth is higher than a certain threshold may be able to provide sufficiently high transfers,
such that their children are able to attend college. While it can be shown that first-order
conditions are still necessary for optimality in this case (see Clausen and Strub (2011)), they
are not sufficient anymore.64 Concavity guarantees that the solution is a global maximum
and is thus a desirable property of any maximization problem.
Fortunately, there are several model features which smooth out the kinks generated by
the education choice. First of all, parental transfers can be used for college and non-college
related expenditures. At the threshold, when young households decide to enter college, they
are forced to reduce their other consumption expenditures accordingly. The resulting utility
loss partly outweighs the utility gain associated with college attendance. Therefore, the kink
in the (parental) value function at the threshold is less pronounced.65 Second of all, skill
61The algorithm converges at a geometric rate, see Laitner (2001)
62An exception is the parental problem (3), for reasons that I describe in the next paragraph.
63Therefore its name ’endogenous grid method’.
64Clausen and Strub (2011) derive envelope theorems for non-concave and non-smooth optimization prob-
lem. They show that optimal decisions are never at the kinks induced by discrete choices.
65A similar argument applies to the savings of a parent household in model period j = 31. Parental savings
increment parental wealth holdings, which are part of the child household’s state space. Because parents
46
accumulation in form of college success and (observable) ability is stochastic. Uncertainty
generates a ’smoothing effect’, as demonstrated by Gomes et al. (2001).
It turns out that these two model elements are sufficient to make Vp,w(s
31
p,w) concave.
Vp,w(s
31
p,w) is plotted in Figure 10. In order to make sure that this finding is not the result of
some kind of numerical approximation routine, I solve the parental problem in j = 31 using
a standard grid search procedure.
9.2 Computation of the Equilibrium
Using the policy functions which were computed previously, I can now solve for the equilib-
rium allocation. Computing an equilibrium involves the following steps:
1. Choose the policy parameters, that is, determine the social security replacement rate
rep, the tax rate for capital income τk and a college subsidy rule ν.
2. Provide an initial guess for the aggregate (physical) capital stock K0, the aggregate
human capital stock H0 and the labor tax rate τw. Given the guesses for K and H, use
the first-order conditions from the firm’s problem to obtain the relative factor prices r
and w.
3. Compute the optimal decision rules as outlined in the previous section.
4. Compute the time invariant measure Φ of agents over the state space.
5. Compute the aggregate asset holdings K1 and the new human capital stock L1 using
asset market clearing condition. Given K1 and L1, update r, w and τw.
6. If m = max
(
K1−K0
K1
, L1−L0
L1
)
< 10−3 stop; otherwise return to step 2 and replace K0
with K1 and L0 with L1.
In step 4, I find the time-invariant measure of agents Φ by iterating on the aggregate law
of motion, as it is commonly done in models with an infinite time horizon. In the model,
the measure of parents in their fist period of adulthood depends on the transition of children
(because all parents were children one period before). In turn, the measure of children in
their first period of life depends on the measure of their parents (because children receive
transfers and education). Stationarity requires that the probability measure is constant over
time. This implies that, for a given measure of parents, the measure of children exactly
reproduces the measure of their own parents.
decide simultaneously about savings and transfers, given their budget constraint in j = 31, an increase in
transfers reduces savings, all other things equal. From the point of view of the children, the utility loss
associated with a reduction in savings partially outweighs the utility gain associated with an increase in
transfers.
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I approximate the measure of agents by means of a probability density function.66 The
density function is computed and stored on a finite set of grid points. Following R´ıos-Rull
(1997), I choose a grid Ddensity which is finer than the one used in the previous step for
computing the decision rules, that is D ⊆ Ddensity. Choosing a finer grid for the density
increases the precision with which the aggregate variables are computed.67
The optimal choice will almost surely be off-grid. In order to map the optimal choices onto
the grid, I introduce some kind of lottery. An individual with asset choice a′(.) ∈ (ai, ai+1)
is interpreted as choosing asset holdings ai with probability λ and asset holdings ai+1 with
probability (1− λ) where λ solves a′(.) = λai + (1− λ)ai+1. That is, I compute a piecewise
linear approximation to the density function. No lottery is needed for agents for which the
lower bounds on asset holdings is binding, which is the case for a positive fraction of the
population. I thus allocate the grid points such that there closely spaced in the neighborhood
of the lower bound. This is achieved by choosing grid points which are equally spaced in
logarithms. I select the upper bound of Ddensity and D such that it is never found to be
binding.
I find the time invariant measure of agents Φ by iterating on the aggregate law of motion.
The forward recursion starts with an initial distribution of young agents in model period
j = 1, Φ1. This requires an initial guess for the distribution of parents in model period
j = 31. Following Heer (2001), a uniform distribution is taken as an initial guess. Using the
decision rules, one can then derive Φ31, from which an update of Φ1 can be obtained. Φ31 is
then updated until convergence.
As a check on the internal consistency, aggregate consumption, investment, transfers
and output are computed in order to ensure that the good market clearing condition is
approximately satisfied.
66Heer and Maußner (2005) argue that approximating the time-invariant measure of agents with the help of
a density function saves up to 40 percent of CPU time compared to an approximation using the distribution.
Computing the distribution function requires computing the inverse of the policy function.
67The gains in precision (as measured by aggregate excess demand) by doing so are enormous. The reason
is that the aggregate good market clearing condition is just a weighted average of the individuals’ budget
constraints, where the weights are derived from the grid points of the density Φ. The finer the grid in Φ, the
better will be the correspondence between the optimal policies and the resulting weights, leading to better
aggregation results.
48
10 Appendix III: Graphs
Figure 2: Enrolment Rates NLSY79. Source: Belley and Lochner (2007), Fig. 2a.
Figure 3: Enrolment Rates NLSY97. Source: Belley and Lochner (2007), Fig. 2b.
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Figure 4: Enrolment Rates Model Economy 1980. Fraction of youth enrolled in college,
conditional on observable ability/family income quartiles. Variables are defined as described
in the text.
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Figure 5: Enrolment Rates Model Economy 1980, No Borrowing Constraints.
Fraction of youth enrolled in college, conditional on observable ability/family income quar-
tiles. Variables are defined as described in the text.
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Figure 6: Enrolment Rates Model Economy 2000. Fraction of youth enrolled in college,
conditional on observable ability/family income quartiles. Variables are defined as described
in the text.
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Figure 7: Enrolment Rates Model Economy 2000, No Borrowing Constraints.
Fraction of youth enrolled in college, conditional on observable ability/family income quar-
tiles. Variables are defined as described in the text.
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Figure 8: Mean Asset Holdings over the Life Cycle, Economy 1980, Baseline Calibration.
Solid Line = High School Graduates, Dashed Line = College Graduates
Figure 9: Mean Asset Holdings over the Life Cycle, Economy 1980, No Transmission of
Innate Ability Between Generations. Solid Line = High School Graduates, Dashed Line =
College Graduates. Remark: Details of the calibration procedure and an interpretation are
given in section 6.3
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Figure 10: Value function for different levels of household wealth, after controlling for edu-
cation, productivity and children’s ability shock
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11 Appendix IV: Tables
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters with Direct Empirical Counterpart for ’Economy 1980’
Parameter Description Value
ψj survival probabilities see text
α capital share of income 0.36
δ capital depreciation rate 0.08
γ risk aversion 1.5
εej life cycle earnings profile see text
ρhs earnings persistence high school 0.946
ρhs variance shocks 0.015
ρcol earnings persistence college 0.955
σcol variance shocks 0.010
τK capital income tax rate 0.2
rep replacement ratio pensions 0.4
ν0 max. share of tuition fees financed by subsidies 0.75
νasset impact of capital income on college subsidies 0.2
νasset impact of labor income on college subsidies 0.7
Notes: The source for all parameters describing the income process (εej , ρ
e and
σe) is Hubbard et al. (1995). For detailed information regarding modifications and
definitions, please refer to the main text.
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Table 3: Parameters characterizing the Economy 2000
Parameter Description Value 1980 2000
σhs variance shocks 0.015 0.025
σcol variance earnings shocks 0.01 0.016
χ¯ upper limit on loans 1 1.25
κ¯ average cost of college 2.16 5.2
Notes: This table compares the parameter values of the economy 1980 and the
economy 2000. Important: the increase in the college premium is achieved by
multiplying the age-earnings profile εej by 1.4. All other parameter values, not
mentioned in this table, are identical in both the economy 1980 and 2000. For
detailed information regarding modifications and definitions, please refer to the
main text.
Table 4: Average Enrolment Gap for Different Experiments
Experiment controlling for obs. ability and for parental edu.
Economy 1980 17 7
Economy 1980, no transmission of ability 9 6
Notes: Table displays the average enrolment gap, that is differences in college enrolment rates between
youth from families in the highest income quartile and youth from other families. The average enrolment
gap is computed by weighting the gaps with the population share of the respective group. In all exper-
iments, I control for observable ability. In the second column, I also control for parental education. In
the second row, I shut down the transmission of academic ability between generations, as described in
section 6.3
Table 5: Enrolment Characteristics for Different Experiments
Experiment % enrolled % graduates % interest rate
Economy 1980 36 28 3.6
borrowing unrestricted 60 44 3.6
Economy 2000 49 36 2.7
borrowing unrestricted 67 47 2.7
Notes: The Table shows the total enrolment rate, the fraction of college gradu-
ates and the interest rate for different experiments. ’Economy 1980’ refers to the
baseline calibration, while the line ’Economy 2000’ denotes the calibration 2000.
The entries for ’borrowing unrestricted’ refer to the respective experiments without
borrowing limits. The share of households that is borrowing constrained in their
college decision is thus given by the difference between the college enrolment rates.
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Table 6: College Enrolment Rates in %, Controlling for Parental Education, Economy 1980
% (Economy 1980, No Borrowing Constraints)
Ability Quartile 1 Ability Quartile 2 Ability Quartile 3 Ability Quartile 4
Income Quartile 1 7.4(49.4) 19.6(56.2) 21(64.5) 15.2(55.4)
Income Quartile 2 13.8(37.7) 35(57.3) 37.4(81.7) 27.3(55.1)
Income Quartile 3 11.3(28.2) 30.3(49.6) 32.4(76.2) 23.4(47.2)
Income Quartile 4 13.4(20) 38.8(54) 41.7(1) 29.5(50.0)
Notes: This table reports college enrolment rates in the economy 1980 for different subgroups of the population, after
parental education has been controlled for. The values in parentheses refer to the experiment where borrowing limits
are relaxed, see the main text for further details. The values confirm pattern that are visible by comparing Figures 4
and 5. See footnote 47 in the main text.
Table 7: Share of College Graduates in Economy 1980 in % (Economy 2000)
Ability Quartile 1 Ability Quartile 2 Ability Quartile 3 Ability Quartile 4
Income Quartile 1 <1(<1) <1(<1) <1(<1) <1(<1)
Income Quartile 2 <1(<1) <1(<1) <1(<1) <1(<1)
Income Quartile 3 5.7(13) 25(40) 30(56) 57(70)
Income Quartile 4 46(99) 83(99) 87(99) 95(99)
Notes: Fraction of parent households with a college degree, in different subgroups of the population (income quartile
in which parental income falls, quartile of the child’s observable ability). <1 denotes ”less than 1 percent”. Values for
the Economy 2000 are shown in parentheses.
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Table 8: Average Savings and Transfers of High School and College Graduates, Age 45-55
with at least one child (in 1983 US-Dollar)
no controlling for controlling for income controls as before
controls income quartile & wealth quartile & kids in college
High School 13512 23598** 35497** -16817
(Std.Error) (8780 ) (6015 ) (8436 ) (48000 )
Saving College 75014 -51676* -50254* -79008
(Std.Error) (50457 ) (27964 ) (26985 ) (61185 )
H0: Col=HS Not Rejected Rejected Rejected Not Rejected
High School 2547** 1372** 659 16279.03**
(Std.Error) (435 ) (489 ) (707 ) (3259.39 )
Transfers College 11678** 7211** 6559** 13409**
(Std.Error) (2192 ) (1925 ) (1857 ) (4204 )
H0: Col=HS Rejected Rejected Rejected Not Rejected
Notes: Data are from the 1983 and 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances. Variables are constructed as described in the
text. Estimates are obtained from regressing transfers/saving on a set of dummies. The omitted categories are chosen
as follows: high school graduates (column 3); high school graduates, 3rd income quartile (column 4); high school
graduates, 3rd income quartile, 3rd wealth quartile (columns 5 and 6). SCF sample weights are used as probability
weights in all specifications. I also experimented with other omitted categories, and found that results are similar.
* indicates statistical significance at 10% level
** indicates statistical significance at 5% level
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